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PROTECTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS: THE STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Alexander Scolnik *
As e-mail and other forms of electronic communications began becoming
widely used, Congress recognized the need to protect these new forms of
communication from impermissible intrusion. Unsure whether the flexible
approach to determining the extent of Fourth Amendment protections as
announced in Katz v. United States would extend to electronic
communications, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA) to ensure a baseline level of protection. This Note argues that
the Fourth Amendment does extend to electronic communications and,
therefore, the provisions of the ECPA that allow the government to access
certain electronic communications without a search warrant are
unconstitutional.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRO DUCTION .......................................................................................... 350
I. COMMUNICATIONS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ............................ 351
A . The Third-Party D octrine ......................................................... 355
1. Delivery and Routing Information Directly Conveyed to
T hird Parties ...................................................................... 356
2. Records and Information Stored in Databases Managed
by T hird Parties ................................................................. 357
B. Fourth Amendment Standards Evolve with Technology ....... 361
1. Telephone Conversations ................................................... 362
a. O lm stead v. United States ............................................ 362
b. K atz v. U nited States .................................................... 363
2. Postal M ail ......................................................................... 365
3. Telegraph M essages ........................................................... 368
C. Legislative Actions To Protect Electronic Communications .... 372
1. Motivation for the Electronic Communications Privacy
A ct ..................................................................................... 3 7 2
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; B.E., 2006, Cooper Union. I
would like to thank my advisor, Professor Katherine Strandburg, for her insightful comments
and feedback and my family and friends for their support and encouragement.
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
2. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Fram ew ork ........................................................................ 375
3. Internet Use After the Electronic Communications
Privacy A ct ........................................................................ 378
4. Protections Under State Law ............................................. 380
II. DIFFERENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ............. 382
A. The Stored Communications Act in Action ............................... 382
B. Applying the Fourth Amendment to Electronic
C om m unications ..................................................................... 383
1. E-mail: Warshakv. United States ..................................... 384
2. Text Messages: Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co .... 386
3. Protection for Other Electronic Information ...................... 389
a. Information Held by, but Not Directed to, Third
P arties ......................................................................... 389
b. Information Reviewed by Third Parties ...................... 392
III. SECTION 2703 OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED .................................................. 393
C O N CLU SION ............................................................................................. 397
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that local law enforcement officers suspect one of the town's
residents is trafficking drugs. The officers have a hunch that this person
may be involved but have never observed anything that would give them
probable cause to obtain a warrant to search him or any of his property.
But, with some legwork, the officers discover that the suspect uses a free,
public e-mail service. They then serve a subpoena on that service directing
the provider to turn over all of the suspect's messages that are over 180
days old and prohibiting the provider from notifying the suspect. In
response to this request, the officers receive thousands of old messages
spanning everything from legitimate business correspondence to personal
messages, online shopping receipts, and beyond. Still armed with nothing
more than a hunch, the officers begin to comb through this individual's
voluminous e-mail records describing all manner of personal information
on a quest for probative evidence.
Congress recognized the potential problems that could flow from
unlimited review of e-mails and other electronic communications in this
and similar situations and grew concerned that existing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence might not encompass these new forms of communication.
This is partly because electronic communications frequently pass through
third-party intermediaries during transmission, and even though the
messages are not directed to the providers, these third parties often store
copies of the communications on their servers. In response to these
concerns, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
350 [Vol. 78
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(ECPA)1 to guarantee a baseline level of protection for electronic
communications including e-mail. 2
Despite the ECPA's goal of broadly protecting electronic
communications, the Act is premised on computer technology from the
1980s, and the developments over the past twenty years render some
provisions of the ECPA inconsistent with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. 3
Part I of this Note describes the current Fourth Amendment framework
and how it has been applied to other forms of communication as well as to
information that passes through third-party intermediaries. Part I also
discusses the history behind the ECPA. Part II examines the conflict
between two recent cases, which hold that electronic communications are
protected by the Fourth Amendment, and the provisions of the ECPA,
which allow access to these communications on a lesser showing than is
required under the Constitution. Finally, Part III concludes that § 2703(b)
of the Stored Communication Act (SCA), which allows law enforcement
access to electronic messages greater than 180 days old without a warrant,
is unconstitutional as applied.
I. COMMUNICATIONS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." 4  The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently stressed that the
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure is
an individual right that "protects people, not places."' 5 When drafting the
Fourth Amendment, the framers could not have anticipated technological
advances such as e-mail and other forms of electronic communications that
would later arise and be used by the public. 6 Similarly, they could not have
envisioned the new modes of surveillance that would become available for
government use in investigating crime. 7 However, the framers did intend to
protect individuals from unreasonable government interference, 8 and,
consequently, courts continually have had to interpret the broad language of
1. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C §§ 2510-22, 2701-12, 3121-27 (2006)); see also infra
Part I.C.
2. See infra Part I.C.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
6. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 115, 118-19
(1999).
7. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1989) (holding that aerial
surveillance of an individual's home from a helicopter does not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
8. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 150 (1999).
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this amendment in light of new technological and social developments in
order to define the scope of the protections it offers. 9
The Supreme Court has recognized that, apart from the specific items
enumerated, "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to
protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State."' 0 "It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of
his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property." " I
Government agents typically must obtain a warrant specifying the area to
be searched and the items to be seized before they may conduct a search to
comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 12 The Framers
abhorred general warrants and writs of assistance, 13 and, to ameliorate these
concerns, required that government agents obtain warrants supported by
probable cause before conducting searches. 14  The Constitution
incorporates this concern by requiring that "no Warrants shall issue" unless
they "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." 15 The specificity requirement prevents agents from
engaging in "fishing expeditions" that were possible under general
warrants. 16
9. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (concluding that the use of a
thermal imager to detect heat radiating from a home is a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding that aerial
surveillance of a home is not a search in an age "where private and commercial flight in the
public airways is routine"); Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53 (recognizing that telephone
conversations are protected under the Fourth Amendment); see also infra Part I.B.
10. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (finding no Fourth Amendment
violation where a police officer directed a physician to draw a blood sample from a person
suspected of drunk driving).
11. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (holding that forcing a criminal
defendant to produce incriminating documents is a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999)
(noting that "[t]he Fourth Amendment generally requires police to secure a warrant before
conducting a search"). The primary exception to the warrant requirement is for situations
involving exigent circumstances where the law enforcement officer does not have time to
procure a warrant because of dangerous conditions, possible disappearance of evidence, or
other similar concerns. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. For a discussion of practical
examples stemming from this exception, see Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1473-74 (1985).
13. Writs of assistance were generally used in support of customs and excise
investigations and enabled the bearer to search any and all houses he or she suspected might
contain probative evidence. See generally William J. Cuddihy, "A Man's House Is His
Castle": New Light on an Old Case, REvs. IN AM. HIST., Mar. 1979, at 64, 64-69.
14. See LEVY, supra note 8, at 158; Cuddihy, supra note 13, at 64-69.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. See Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amendment, 21 GA. L. REv. 107, 115
(1986) ("The spirit and letter of the fourth amendment counselled against the belief that
Congress intended to authorize a 'fishing expedition' into private papers on the possibility
that they might disclose a crime."). The warrant requirement is not a mere technicality, but
strikes the appropriate balance between the rights of individuals to be free from unreasonable
searches and the government's need to uncover probative evidence. See, e.g., Brinegar v.
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In spite of the broad protection the Fourth Amendment offers from
warrantless searches, not all government actions that uncover probative
evidence are "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 17
and the Fourth Amendment does not protect individuals from searches in all
areas. 18 Justice John Marshall Harlan II, concurring in the judgment in
Katz v. United States,19 suggested that individuals are protected by the
Fourth Amendment in only those areas where they have both a subjective
expectation of privacy and that expectation is objectively reasonable. 20
Katz arose when government agents used an electronic surveillance device
attached to the exterior of a phone booth to eavesdrop on the caller's
conversation.2 1  Although not explicitly enumerated in the text of the
Fourth Amendment, the majority concluded that an individual using a
public phone booth is "entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world," and found that the contents
of phone conversations are protected under the Fourth Amendment. 22
The Supreme Court has since embraced Justice Harlan's two-prong
approach for determining the scope of Fourth Amendment protections. 23 A
subjective expectation of privacy alone is insufficient to create a privacy
right, because, as the Court noted, regardless of how private he believes his
actions are, a burglar in an abandoned summer cabin should not be
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 24 In that situation, any subjective
expectation of privacy the burglar might have is not one society recognizes
as reasonable. 25  Although the Court stressed that when considering
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable, "arcane distinctions
developed in property and tort law.., ought not to control," the expectation
must be one that has a source outside the Fourth Amendment.26 This is a
flexible test designed to account for the many varied situations under which
Fourth Amendment searches may take place. 27 However, inherent in the
flexibility is a level of uncertainty as to the extent of protection in areas the
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). Additionally, the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule offers strong protections to those whose rights have been violated by
barring the government from using any illegally obtained evidence. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 657-58 (1961).
17. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005) (holding that a drug-
detecting dog's sniff is not a search).
18. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978) (holding that passengers in a
car are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for search of the car).
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 348 (majority opinion).
22. Id. at 352.
23. See, e.g., Rakas, 439 U.S. at 151 (Powell, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 143 & n.12 (majority opinion).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 143.
27. See, e.g., Cecil J. Hunt II, Calling in the Dogs: Suspicionless Sniff Searches and
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 285, 313-14 (2005).
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Supreme Court has not previously considered, particularly in new media
such as electronic communications. 28
Katz did, however, affirm that individuals do not have reasonable
expectations of privacy and, therefore, are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment, where they voluntarily expose items to public view. 29 From
this premise, the Court has developed a third-party exception that finds that
individuals do not have reasonable expectations of privacy in items turned
over to third parties, and that the Fourth Amendment therefore does not
govern search and seizure of items in a third party's possession. 30
E-mail and other forms of electronic communications are transmitted
over servers which are frequently run by third parties. For example, if we
were to imagine that Jeremy used the free e-mail account provided by his
Internet service provider (ISP) to compose an e-mail to his friend Richard at
Richard's work e-mail account, the message would go from Jeremy's
computer, through his ISP's servers and over the Internet, to the mail server
run either by Richard's company or another third-party ISP. The message
will then be directed to Richard's mailbox, where it will sit until he
attempts to retrieve it. When Richard downloads the message, if he wants
to forward it to his coworker James, the message will go up from Richard's
computer to the server run by his firm, and into James's mailbox.31
Although Richard is the only intended initial recipient of Jeremy's e-mail
message, the message passes through Jeremy's ISP's server, where
administrators have the technical capability to inspect the contents of the
message. However, when Richard forwards that same message to James at
an address inside his firm, the message stays on the firm's e-mail server and
does not pass through the hands of any third parties. 32
Many e-mail messages, such as the hypothetical one discussed above
from Jeremy to Richard, are sent through free, public services or pass
through servers run by third-party ISPs at many points during transmission.
This third-party interaction with the communication complicates Fourth
Amendment analysis. 33
28. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 43 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Richard
A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SuP. CT. REV.
173, 188.
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
30. See infra Part I.A.
31. For a more detailed description of how e-mail works, see Deirdre K. Mulligan,
Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1557, 1562-63 (2004);
Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes as E-mails Get
Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REv. 1043, 1050-51 (2008); see also Wikipedia, E-Mail,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email (last visited Aug. 20, 2009).
32. There is, of course, the possibility that Richard and James's office will not run its
own mail server, but will rely on the services provided by a third party ISP.
33. See infra Part L.A-B.
[Vol. 78
2009] PROTECTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 355
A. The Third-Party Doctrine
The Fourth Amendment may protect an individual from unreasonable
searches of items she seeks to maintain as private, but the Supreme Court
has in several cases adopted a "Third-Party Doctrine," which finds that an
individual no longer has such an expectation of privacy where the items in
question are voluntarily turned over to third parties. 34 For example, the
Court found that the infamous president of the Teamster's Union, James
"Jimmy" Hoffa, could not assert a Fourth Amendment challenge to
suppress statements he voluntarily made to a third party who later turned
and communicated the substance of those conversations to government
agents. 3 5 Hoffa made the incriminating statements in his hotel room to an
associate Edward Partin, who Hoffa expected would keep the information
private.36 However, in doing so the Court noted that Hoffa was "not
relying on the security of the hotel room; he was relying upon his misplaced
confidence that Partin would not reveal his wrongdoing." 37  In this
situation, Hoffa voluntarily turned the information over to the third party
and, therefore, could not control that individual's use of the information or
later complain if he chose to inform others, notably the government, about
it. 38
Based on decisions like United States v. Hoffa,39 the government is free
to subpoena messages from their intended recipients without implicating the
Fourth Amendment. However, individuals do not forfeit all Fourth
Amendment protections merely by conveying some information to third
parties.40  Particularly in light of new technology and new forms of
communication and surveillance, as present in Katz, the Supreme Court has
had to balance these competing interests to determine the extent of an
individual's protections.
Applying the principles of Hoffa, and focusing on information directed to
third parties, the Court carved out an exception to the otherwise strong
protections afforded to telephone conversations 41 and postal mail 42 for
delivery and routing information that is directly conveyed to third parties
for their use in connecting and delivering the communications. 43 The Court
34. For a defense of this doctrine, see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party
Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 561 (2009).
35. United States v. Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966).
36. Id. at 302.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 302-03. The Court also relied on its earlier decision in Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427 (1963), which noted that the risk of being "betrayed by an informer or
deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions
of human society. It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak." Id. at
465 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. 385 U.S. 293.
40. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
41. See infra Part I.B.l.b.
42. See infra Part I.B.2.
43. See infra Part I.A. 1.
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similarly held that other information voluntarily conveyed to third parties
and stored in their databases is not protected by the Fourth Amendment."
1. Delivery and Routing Information Directly Conveyed to Third Parties
After Katz, although phone companies have the technical sophistication
to easily listen to or record phone conversations, 45 the content of these
conversations is protected under the Fourth Amendment. 46 However, in
Smith v. Maryland,47 the Supreme Court approved the government's use of
pen registers48 to track the telephone numbers individuals dialed.49 In
contrast to the strong protections for the substance of phone conversations,
the Court concluded that individuals do not have reasonable expectations of
privacy in the numbers dialed since they voluntarily convey this
information to the phone company. 50 The Court inferred from the fact that
customers received itemized bills listing the long-distance calls they made,
"[t]elephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical
information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities
for recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact
record this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes." 51
With this awareness, the Court held that, in general, individuals do not have
even a subjective expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial. 52
However, the Court went on to apply the second prong of the Katz test,
and held that, even if the particular defendant in Smith did have a subjective
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he dialed, it was not an
expectation society recognized as reasonable in light of the telephone
companies' regular practice of recording this information. 53 Therefore, the
government's use of this information still would not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 54
Similarly, although postal workers could easily open and inspect the
contents of the letters and packages they are delivering, these
communications are strongly protected by the Fourth Amendment.55 At the
same time, the U.S. Postal Service is expected to deliver the items deposited
44. See infra Part I.A.2.
45. See HAROLD F. TIPTON & MICKI KRAUSE, INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT
HANDBOOK 178 (4th ed. 2002); Wikipedia, Telephone Tapping,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telephone tapping (last visited Aug. 20, 2009).
46. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); infra Part I.B.l.b.
47. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
48. "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is
released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are
actually completed." United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977).
49. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741-42.
50. Id. at 742.
51. Id. at 743.
52. Id. at 742.
53. Id. at 744-45.
54. Id.
55. See infra Part I.B.2.
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with it to their intended recipients. In doing so the Postal Service is
expected to, and indeed must, read the address and other information
displayed on the exterior of the package. 56 Because this information is not
only voluntarily turned over, but also directed to the third-party Postal
Service, it is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 57
These decisions recognize that the mere fact that some part of a
communication, such as the telephone number or delivery address, is
directed to a third party, does not give that third party access to the entire
communication. Additionally, although the third party may have the
potential to access information in its possession, this does not suffice to
bring the information within the purview of the third-party doctrine or limit
Fourth Amendment protections. 58
A limited application of the third-party doctrine to information actually
conveyed to the third party is also applicable to electronic messages. 59
Electronic communications will also generally pass through servers
controlled by third parties before ultimately arriving in the intended
recipient's mailbox.60 Like the Postal Service, e-mail providers' computer
systems are expected to "read" some of the address information so that they
may properly route and deliver the messages. 61 However, e-mail providers
are not expected to review the content of the messages, and Part III of this
Note concludes that, because they are only expected to read the noncontent,
address information, the sender does not forfeit her Fourth Amendment
rights in the content of the message.62
2. Records and Information Stored in
Databases Managed by Third Parties
In addition to information directly conveyed to third parties for their use,
many entities also maintain databases that contain information gathered
from their users and customers. 63 Consistent with its decisions regarding
information turned over to third parties, the Supreme Court has held that
where records are entrusted to third parties, the third party's concurrent
access may eliminate an individual's privacy interest and, consequently, the
protections she is afforded under the Fourth Amendment. For example, in
56. For a description of the United States Postal Service's mail sorting system, see
Wikipedia, United States Postal Service, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UnitedStates_
PostalService (last visited Aug. 20, 2009).
57. See Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); see also United States v. Huie, 593
F.2d 14, 14-15 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation in performing a
"mail cover" by recording all information on exterior of mail before delivering).
58. Cf infra Part I.A.2.
59. See infra Part II.A-B.
60. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
62. See infra Part II.
63. For a discussion of the vast array of information compiled in both private and public
databases, see Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1137 (2002).
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United States v. Miller,6 the Court concluded that individuals do not have
reasonable expectations of privacy in financial records held by third
parties. 65
In Miller, Mitchell Miller was convicted of carrying on the business of a
distiller without giving bond in an attempt to avoid the whiskey tax. 66 The
government subpoenaed checks and financial records from the two banks
used by Miller and relied on those documents as evidence at trial. 67 The
Court held that, like Jimmy Hoffa speaking to his associate, Miller had
"assumed the risk" that any documents he turned over to the bank could
later find their way into the hands of the government. 68 Therefore, Miller
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their contents and could not
claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 69
Much like in Smith, where the Court held that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed because they had been "turned
over" to the phone company, 70 here too, by turning his checks over to the
bank, the Court concluded that Miller lost any expectation of privacy he
might otherwise have had by maintaining the checks in his private
possession. 71
The agents in Miller actually reviewed microfilm copies of Miller's
records, which further supported the Court's conclusion that the Fourth
Amendment did not protect Miller in this situation because the items
searched were not Miller's "private papers," but the bank's business
records. 72 However, the Court then went on to note that even if the agents
had viewed the originals created by Miller and held by the bank, Miller still
would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in them. 73 This is
because "[t]he checks are not confidential communications but negotiable
instruments to be used in commercial transactions." 74 Even the deposit
slips and monthly accountings were not protected because they only
contained information that, according to the Court, had been "voluntarily
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary
course of business." 75
Similarly, three years earlier, in Couch v. United States,76 the Court held
that an individual could not assert either Fourth or Fifth Amendment
64. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
65. Id. at 442.
66. Id. at 436.
67. Id. at 437-38.
68. Id. at 443.
69. Id. ("The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.").
70. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979); supra notes 47-54 and accompanying
text.
71. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43.
72. Id. at 440.
73. Id. at 442.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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challenges to prevent the government from subpoenaing tax records in the
possession of the individual's accountant. 77  Writing for the majority,
Justice Lewis Powell found that the defendant could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the records she handed over to her accountant
because they were in the possession of a third party, and she knew that
much of the information would have to be turned over to the government
while preparing her taxes. 78 However, in dissent, Justice William Douglas
noticed that "[u]nder these circumstances, it hardly can be said that by
giving the records to the accountant, the petitioner committed them to the
public domain." 79  Unlike Justice Douglas's dissent, Justice Powell's
opinion conceives of privacy under the Fourth Amendment as binary-as
soon as a third party is given access to information the individual's privacy
interest vanishes. 80  However, Justice Douglas recognized the societal
understanding that, although a third party had access to the information, the
third party was expected to keep it private and not to disseminate it freely. 8 1
Like the financial institutions in Smith and the accountants in Couch,
ISPs frequently maintain databases containing personal and transactional
information about their users, and often store and archive copies of the
electronic communications they process. 82  Many individuals also use
Intemet-based e-mail (Webmail) systems where all of their messages are
stored in electronic mailboxes on their e-mail providers' remote servers. 83
Some lower courts have taken an expansive view of the third-party
exception, and have found that individuals do not have reasonable
expectations of privacy in credit card statements, 84 utility records, 85 motel
registration records, 86 or employment records. 87 Some information in these
databases, such as subscriber information, is directly conveyed to the ISP
for its use, and is not protected by the Fourth Amendment after Miller.88
However, even though other information, such as archival or backup copies
of messages, are not stored by the ISP for its use, an expansive
interpretation of the third-party doctrine could potentially eliminate a user's
Fourth Amendment protections for this information. 89
77. Id. at 335-36.
78. Id. at 335.
79. See id. at 340 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 329 (majority opinion).
81. Id.
82. See infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
84. United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 1993).
85. United States v. Starkweather, No. 91-30354, 1992 WL 204005, at *1-2 (9th Cir.
Aug. 24, 1992); United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1398 (D. Wyo. 1994).
86. United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1498 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
87. United States v. Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979-80 (D. Or. 2006).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2008)
(acknowledging that "[e]very federal court to address this issue has held that subscriber
information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment's
privacy expectation").
89. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK 153 (2007). In the context of
electronic communications, although third-party intermediaries will sometimes have access
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Smith and Miller have been criticized over time, particularly as more
personal information is incorporated into privately managed databases. 90
Private entities had already accumulated large amounts of information
before Smith and Miller were decided.91 However, with a greater number
of transactions being completed electronically, far more records are being
created and stored, and the universe of information contained in databases
controlled by third parties is greatly expanding. 92 Since this information is
currently accorded no Fourth Amendment protection, and may be accessed
with a subpoena, the government frequently relies on it during criminal
investigations and prosecutions. 93 Even when information culled from
databases is used to combat serious threats such as terrorism, the public has
not always been in favor of extensive government use of this data.94
to the information, they are generally expected not to freely divulge it. For example, GMail,
a popular free e-mail provider, specifically states on their website that they do not read users'
e-mail. See Does Google Read My Mail?, http://mail.google.com/
support/bin/answer.py?answer=6599&topic=12787 (last visited Aug. 20, 2009).
90. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1137 (2002) ("Smith and Miller have been extensively
criticized throughout the past several decades. . . . [They] are the new Olmstead and
Goldman."); see also Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("In a sense a person is defined by the checks he writes. By examining them the
agents get to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections,
religious affiliation, educational interests, the papers and magazines he reads, and so on ad
infinitum."). But see generally Kerr, supra note 34 (defending the third-party doctrine).
91. See Kenneth L. Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls over the Accuracy and
Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 342-43 (1966). For
example, in 1960, First National Bank of Boston began using an underground bunker made
of steel-reinforced concrete strong enough to survive a three megaton blast to maintain
records. John H. Fenton, Bank Constructs a Bomb Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1960, at 41.
The facility was not designed to store money or valuables--only microfilm and duplicates of
original transactions. Id.
92. See, e.g., SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE
21 ST CENTURY 15-16 (2000); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1198-99 (1998) (comparing the different amount of information
recorded when an individual visits a brick-and-mortar shopping mall and when the
individual shops for the same merchandise online); Know-alls: Datamining, THE
ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 2008, at 73. Additionally, DNA information is increasingly being
stored in government maintained databases. For a discussion of the constitutionality of DNA
extraction statutes, see Charles J. Nerko, Note, Assessing Fourth Amendment Challenges to
DNA Extraction Statutes after Samson v. California, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (2008).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976); Walker v. S.W.I.F.T.
SCRL, 491 F. Supp. 2d 781, 785-86 (N.D. IIl. 2007) (subpoenaing financial information for
terrorist tracking); United States v. Lazar, No. 04-20017, 2006 WL 3761803, at *1 (W.D.
Tenn. Dec. 20, 2006) (denying motion to suppress illegally subpoenaed healthcare records).
For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the third-party doctrine and Justice John Paul
Stevens's views on the subject, see Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under
Justice Stevens's Fourth Amendment?, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1731 (2006).
94. For example, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Department of
Defense began the Total Information Awareness Project (T.I.A.) to help anticipate and stop
terrorist attacks based on information culled from databases. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Year in
Ideas: Total Information Awareness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, at E65; American Civil
Liberties Union, Q&A on the Pentagon's "Total Information Awareness" Program (Apr. 20,
2003), http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/15578res20030420.html. However, just a few
years later, in response to concerns that aggregating all this information posed a threat to
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In light of the rapidly expanding universe of information turned over to
third parties, an expansive interpretation of Miller permits easy access to a
tremendous amount of information. In its later decisions involving these
issues, the Supreme Court began to recognize some of the potential
problems stemming from the increased pooling of information in databases.
For example, in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press,95 a CBS news correspondent made a
request under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain information about
the members of the Medico family contained in their "rap sheets."' 96 The
Court noted that, in spite of the fact that much of the information
summarized in the rap sheets may have been public at one time, there was
still a privacy interest in preventing disclosure of the compilation. 97 More
relevant to the Fourth Amendment inquiry, the majority also recognized
that "[i]n an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or
another divulged to another." s98 The Court also concluded that privacy and
the "Third Party Doctrine" are, for Fourth Amendment purposes, not
binary, and "'the fact that an event is not wholly 'private' does not mean
that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of
the information.' 99  This approach is more analogous to the theory
proposed several years earlier by Justice Douglas in Couch. 100 In the arena
of electronic communications, because ISPs are generally expected to keep
communications private, it limits arguments that electronic communications
are not protected under the Fourth Amendment merely because a third party
retains backup or archival copies on its server. This analysis also comports
with the distinction drawn in Smith and Katz between information actually
turned over to the phone company for its use, and information merely in its
possession. 101
B. Fourth Amendment Standards Evolve with Technology
As technology evolves, giving individuals new forms of communicating
and government agents increasingly sophisticated tools for surveillance,
courts have had to continually interpret the Fourth Amendment and define
the extent of its reach in light of these new advances. When writing for the
majority in Kyllo v. United States, 10 2 even Justice Antonin Scalia, a staunch
personal privacy, Congress halted the project. Adam Clymer, Congress Agrees To Bar
Pentagon from Terror Watch ofAmericans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2003, at Al.
95. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
96. Id. at 757.
97. Id. at 762-63, 767 (noting there is a "privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of
certain information even where the information may have been at one time public").
98. Id. at 763.
99. Id at 770 (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy
Consistent with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, Nelson Timothy Stephens Lecture at
the University of Kansas Law School, (Sept. 26-27, 1974).
100. Cf Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973).
101. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
102. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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believer in originalism, 10 3 remarked on the dangers that would flow if the
Fourth Amendment was not construed in a flexible manner. 10 4  In
particular, the Supreme Court considered the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to telephone conversations and postal mail, and in both cases
concluded that the contents of the communication were protected by the
Fourth Amendment. 10 5 Additionally, although never decided in a reported
judicial decision, commentators at the time argued that telegraph messages
should also be protected under the Fourth Amendment. 106
1. Telephone Conversations
The Supreme Court has not always been as responsive to evolving
technology as it was in Kyllo. 10 7 In 1928, the Court first considered
whether telephone conversations were protected by the Fourth Amendment,
and concluded they were not. 10 8 It was not until almost forty years later
when the Supreme Court reconsidered this important question and, in light
of the growing importance of the telephone, concluded the Fourth
Amendment did extend to these communications. 109
a. Olmstead v. United States
In Olmstead v. United States, " 10 federal agents discovered Roy Olmstead
was involved in an illegal conspiracy to distribute intoxicating liquors after
listening in to conversations between Olmstead and his coconspirators."'1
The agents had tapped Olmstead and his coconspirators' telephones without
entering onto private property. 112 Focusing on the elements of trespass, the
Court concluded that "the Amendment cannot be extended and expanded to
include telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's
house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office
any more than are the highways along which they are stretched." "1
3
However, in dissent, Justice Louis Brandeis expressed his belief that in
expounding the Constitution, the Court should not be so constrained by the
103. For example, see Scott Turow, Scalia the Civil Libertarian?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov.
26, 2006, at 22. Turow notes that "[t]o Scalia, the Bill of Rights means exactly what it did in
1791, no more, no less. The needs of an evolving society, he says, should be addressed by
legislation rather than the courts." Id.
104. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36 (rejecting a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment).
105. See infra Part I.B.1-2.
106. See infra Part I.B.3.
107. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
108. See infra Part 1.B.l.a.
109. See infra Part l.B.1.b.
110. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
111. Id. at 456; see also Mabel Walker Willebrandt, The Inside of Prohibition, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1929, at 14.
112. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
113. Id. at 465.
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limited scope of what the forefathers anticipated." 4 Even in 1928, Justice
Brandeis recognized that
[t]he progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. 115
Justice Brandeis's premonition did not then carry the day, and the
Court's five-to-four decision in Olmstead left law enforcement free to
eavesdrop on telephone conversations. 116 However, as the government
increasingly relied on information gleaned from wiretaps, the public began
to question the majority's wisdom in condoning this activity. 117
b. Katz v. United States
Although telephones were widely used when Olmstead was decided, 118
the telephone became increasingly important to daily life over time, and,
almost forty years later, a situation similar to that in Olmstead arose in Katz
v. United States.119 This time, however, the Court came to a different
conclusion. In Katz, government agents attached an electronic surveillance
device to the exterior of a public phone booth and used it to eavesdrop on
Charles Katz's conversation. 120 Agents overheard Katz placing bets and
obtaining gambling information, and used the information garnered from
these conversations against him at trial. 12 1 In contrast to Olmstead, the
Katz Court rejected the government's argument that because there was no
physical entry into the phone booth, and therefore no trespass, the
114. Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 474.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Nardone, 106 F.2d 41, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1939) (relying on
Olmstead and approving law enforcement use of wiretaps); Valli v. United States, 94 F.2d
687, 691 (1st Cir. 1938) (same).
117. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Tangled Issue of Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1960,
at SM18. But see Dewey Approves Wiretapping Curb, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1938, at 7
(arguing that stronger laws regulating wiretapping would only protect "gangsters and
criminals"). Just six years after Olmstead, Congress enacted legislation making wiretapping
a federal crime. Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 223,
(repealed 1947). However, § 605 did not apply to wiretapping by state actors and did not
cover bugging or other forms of surveillance. See Solove, supra note 90, at 1138-39.
Although recognized as an important step practically, this legislation did little to affect
government surveillance, and commentators urged Congress and the courts to enact broader
protections. See Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for
the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1223-32 (1966).
118. See RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY 161-
62 (1997).
119. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
120. Id. at 348.
121. See id. For a more detailed description of the factual underpinnings, see Katz v.
United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131-32 (9th Cir. 1966).
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surveillance did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.12 2 Even though
privacy in phone booths was not explicitly enumerated in the text of the
Fourth Amendment, the majority concluded that an individual using a
public phone booth is "entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world."' 123 Recognizing the
importance of, and widespread reliance on, this new technology, the Court
noted that "[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital
role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication." 124
By abandoning its previous approach to the Fourth Amendment, which
focused on physical trespass, the Court recognized the importance the
telephone had come to have in society.125 In doing so, Katz corrected the
Court's previous error in Olmstead, which placed substantial emphasis on
historical usages and failed to consider the practical import of the
government's actions. 126 Critics have noted that, in contrast to Katz,
Olmstead "symbolizes the Court's lack of responsiveness to new
technology, unwarranted formalism in its constitutional interpretation, and
failure to see the larger purposes of the Fourth Amendment."' 127
Additionally, Katz is notable for Justice Harlan's concurrence suggesting
that individuals are protected by the Fourth Amendment in areas where they
have a subjective expectation of privacy as long as that expectation of
privacy is objectively reasonable. 128
Although Katz was decided three years before Smith, the two decisions
demonstrate the limits of the third-party doctrine. While an entire phone
call-numbers dialed and content of the conversation-is "turned over" to a
third-party telephone company, these decisions acknowledge that the third-
party exception does not give government agents unbridled access to the
entire call. 129 The telephone number dialed is directly conveyed to the
phone company so that it may connect (and bill for) the call, 130 but the
122. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. The Court went on to note that "the underpinnings of
Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass'
doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling." Id.
123. Id. at 352.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Solove, supra note 90, at 1086 (describing Olmstead as "a relic of the past, a
long discredited decision"); see also Fred P. Graham, High Court Eases Curbs on Bugging;
Adds Safeguard, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1967, at 1.
127. Solove, supra note 90, at 1086.
128. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also supra notes 18-20 and
accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text. Similarly, even though § 605 of the
Wiretap Act was not successful in limiting government eavesdropping, it recognized the
importance of restricting private wiretapping. See supra note 117.
130. For a discussion of the history of telephone networks from manually connected
operator switchboards to present-day digital switching, see Wikipedia, Telephone Exchange,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telephone exchange (last visited Aug. 20, 2009). For a
detailed technical discussion of how telephone calls are connected and routed, see STEPHEN
J. BIGELOW ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TELEPHONE ELECTRONICS (4th ed. 2001).
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content of the call is not similarly directed. 13 1  Even though both the
number dialed and content of the phone conversation pass through the third
party, the content of the phone call is not "turned over" in the same way that
the telephone number dialed is. Katz recognizes that Fourth Amendment
protections for the content of the conversation are not diminished simply
because the content passes through the third-party-intermediary phone
company. 132
E-mail plays a central role in daily life and is used in place of postal mail
or the telephone for many communications. 133 Just as the increased use and
importance of the telephone played into the Court's constitutional analysis
in Katz, the importance of modern day electronic communications also
should inform the constitutional analysis. Additionally, the distinction
between the strong protections offered for the content of phone
conversations and the far weaker protections offered for numbers dialed
demonstrates the boundaries of the third-party doctrine. This distinction
also demonstrates that law enforcement cannot parlay a third party's limited
access to one part of an item into access to all of it. 134
2. Postal Mail
The Supreme Court reached a very similar result to the decision it would
later reach in Katz when, in Ex parte Jackson,'35 it held that the Fourth
Amendment protects the contents of letters and packages deposited in the
U.S. mail system. 136 The text of the Fourth Amendment specifically
includes "papers," and the Court concluded that "[t]he constitutional
guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against
131. Compare Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (holding that the contents of telephone conversations
are protected under the Fourth Amendment), with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44
(1979) (concluding that the telephone numbers an individual dials are not protected under
the Fourth Amendment because they are conveyed to the third-party telephone company).
132. Cf supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. This result does not change even
though the phone company has the technological sophistication to, and could quite easily,
eavesdrop on the phone conversation. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. In the mid-
1990s, however, several circuit courts held that individuals did not have reasonable
expectations of privacy in the contents of conversations made using cordless telephones. See,
e.g., United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 180 (5th Cir. 1992); Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d
705, 706-07 (8th Cir. 1989). Early cordless telephones used radio frequencies to
communicate and conversations could easily be intercepted by third parties within range. See
BRAD GRAHAM & KATHY McGOWAN, 101 SPY GADGETS FOR THE EvIL GENIus 165-66
(2006); see also Smith, 978 F.2d at 178. These courts considered the details of how the
technology worked and found that, because the cordless telephone systems could be easily
intercepted, it was not reasonable for the user to expect privacy. See Smith, 978 F.2d at 180.
Surprisingly, although the court noted that the materials to tap a regular phone could be
readily purchased for under twenty-five dollars, they did not find that this reduced an
individual's expectation of privacy in wired communications. Id. at 179 n. 10.
133. See infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
135. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
136. Id. at 733.
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unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed
against inspection, wherever they may be." 137
Notably, postal mail, like e-mail, is turned over to third parties who are
physically capable of opening and inspecting the contents of the letters they
have been given to deliver. During the colonial period individuals
traditionally used wax to seal their letters, but this wax was ineffective and
often failed to keep the letters securely closed. 138 Despite attempts to
ensure that the mails would remain private, 139 the public widely believed
they were not secure, which prompted a number of prominent individuals to
write in code in an attempt to keep their communications private. 140
Thomas Jefferson, for example, remarked in a letter that "the infidelities of
the post office and the circumstances of the times are against my writing
fully and freely." 141 In response to these concerns, Congress passed several
laws prohibiting the improper opening of mail, 14 2 but, despite the reality
that mail was not being kept private, the Supreme Court ultimately held that
Fourth Amendment protections extended to include postal mail. 143
Particularly in light of these factual underpinnings, Professor Daniel J.
Solove suggests that the Court's decision was more than just a recognition
of an existing privacy interest, but was an example of the Court
constructing a privacy interest that was necessary to preserve the integral
role the mails had come to play in society. 144  Justice Joseph Story
believed, just as Thomas Jefferson had, that individuals would not be
completely candid in their correspondence without having an expectation of
privacy. 145 In such a situation, Justice Story anticipated that the public
would simply stop using the mails "to the detriment of the 'well-being of
society,"' resulting in slowed economic growth and unnecessary burdens
being placed on commercial transactions forced to use less effective means
of communication. 146
137. Id.
138. See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN'S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY
FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 56 (2000); see also Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1087, 1142-43 (2002). A New York Times
editorial from the period remarked on the lack of security for postal mails, noting "[t]he
ordinary letter, sealed with its red wafer, and into which the prying eyes of the village
postmistress so often peeped." Writing-By the Card, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1873, at 4.
139. For example, Benjamin Franklin was in charge of the colonial mails and required all
of his employees to swear an oath not to open the mail. SMITH, supra note 138, at 49; David
J. Seipp, The Right to Privacy in American History 13 (Harvard Univ., Working Paper No.
W-77-5, 1977).
140. SMITH, supra note 138, at 50-51; see also Seipp, supra note 139, at 12-24.
141. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (Nov. 26, 1978), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 309 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
142. SMITH, supra note 138, at 50-51.
143. Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
144. See Solove, supra note 138, at 1143.
145. SMITH, supra note 138, at 51-52 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE 221 (2d ed. 1830)).
146. Id. at 51-52.
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In Ex parte Jackson, although the Court held that the sealed contents of
the communications were protected, it concluded that the address and other
information on the exterior of the package were not. 147 Similarly,
postcards, pamphlets, and other materials "purposely left in a condition to
be examined" when deposited with the Postal Service are afforded no
Fourth Amendment protections. 148 This reasoning recognizes that although
the item is placed in the custody of the Postal Service, the author of a letter
still retains an expectation of privacy in the contents because the Postal
Service is not expected to read that information. At the same time, the
Postal Service is not expected to turn a blind eye to readily visible
information. Quite the contrary, it is expected to deliver the letter to its
intended recipient, and in doing so must read the address and other
information contained on the package. 14 9  While not the focus of the
Court's decision, this distinction serves to protect the "content" information
of a communication, and only allows the government warrantless access to
the "noncontent" information. It also recognizes that depositing an item
with a third party does not necessarily give that individual carte blanche to
do what she wishes. In this case, although third parties theoretically could
read everything, they are expected to read only the information directed to
them-the information on the exterior. 150
Although the Court in Smith did not discuss Ex parte Jackson, it reached
a similar result, and together, the two cases highlight the limits of the third-
party doctrine. In the case of a telephone, the number dialed is necessarily
and intentionally conveyed to the phone company so that the company may
complete the call. 15 1 Similarly, individuals expect the Postal Service to
read the addresses written on the exteriors of the letters they are sending so
that the letters will be delivered properly. 152  However, as the Court
recognized in Ex parte Jackson, individuals do not expect the third-party
carrier--or any other party-to read the contents of the items they are
mailing. 153 These decisions highlight that a third party merely having
access to an item does not suffice to bring the information within the
purview of the third-party doctrine, and also recognize the importance of
extending Fourth Amendment protections to dominant forms of
communication.
147. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 732-33; see also United States v. Huie, 593 F.2d 14,
14-15 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that performing a "mail cover" and recording all information
on exterior of mail before delivering does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
148. Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
149. Cf supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing Katz's holding that what a
person voluntarily exposes to the public view is not protected by the Fourth Amendment).
150. See Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
151. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 137 and accompanying text; cf supra notes 138-46 and
accompanying text.
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3. Telegraph Messages
Telegraph transmissions share some of the characteristics of present day
electronic communications, but the process of sending a telegram is far less
automated and requires greater human interaction. 154 Like postal mail and
e-mail, most telegrams traveled over networks run by third parties. 155
However, unlike sealed letters, telegraph messages are far more exposed to
review by intermediaries while in transit. 156 Notwithstanding this reality,
commentators writing while telegraphs were widely used viewed these
messages as the then-modem-day equivalent of postal mail and believed
that they should be protected to the same extent as the mails. 157
After Samuel Morse demonstrated his telegraph in 1838, telegraph
networks were quickly deployed across the United States and other
countries, enabling people to send instantaneous messages. 158 Despite the
higher cost of sending messages by telegraph, the telegraph's speed
advantage displaced some business from the Post Office. 159 Users would
write out their messages and hand them over to telegraph operators to
encode and transmit across the telegraph lines. 160 At the other end, another
operator would capture, decode, and transcribe the transmission, and then
deliver the message to its intended recipient. 161 In addition to the potential
for eavesdropping during transmission, telegraphy in this setting requires
that the operators on both ends actually read the messages. 162 At the time,
telegraph operators sought to maintain an impersonal attitude to the
messages they delivered, but, particularly in small towns, they were "privy
to most everything that went on in the town."' 63
During the American Civil War, the telegraph was widely used, and
government officials grew concerned about security leaks. 164 To uncover
treason and guard military secrets, the government seized and reviewed all
154. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
155. See generally LEWIS COE, THE TELEGRAPH (1993).
156. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 167-88 and accompanying text.
158. See generally James B. Calvert, The Electromagnetic Telegraph (Dec. 26, 2008),
http://mysite.du.edu/-jcalvert/tel/morse/morse.htm.
159. See id; see also Over Land and Ocean, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1896, at 8 (describing
the development of the worldwide telegraph network and the speed at which messages can
be transmitted using the telegraph).
160. See generally COE, supra note 155.
161. See id.; see also, e.g., Peterson v. W. Union Tel. Co., 74 N.W. 1022, 1022 (Minn.
1898) (describing the process of sending a telegraph); Pegram v. W. Union Tel. Co., 2 S.E.
256, 257-58 (N.C. 1887).
162. See COE, supra note 155, at 70-71 (describing a particularly capable operator who
was able to remember several minutes of transmitted messages while sharpening a pencil
before transcribing); see also Peterson, 74 N.W. at 1022. Additionally, telegraphy students
would frequently practice by listening to the wires at the local telegraph office. COE, supra
note 155, at 107.
163. See COE, supra note 155, at 116.
164. See Seipp, supra note 139, at 46.
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telegrams. 165 After the war, Congress undertook additional investigations
and sought to uncover evidence from the files of telegraph operators,
particularly Western Union, the primary telegraph operator at the time. 166
Members of the public were outraged when they discovered that Congress
was reviewing telegraph messages. 167  Eventually, members of the
legislature discovered that. even their own messages were being
reviewed. 168  Even though Congress promised it would keep the
information it learned confidential, these assurances were not enough to
appease the public's concerns. 169 In response, Western Union adopted
Rule 128, which prohibited the disclosure of messages to anyone other than
the intended recipient. 170
Acting under orders from the company's president, William J. Orton,
Western Union managers began to refuse government requests to turn over
private telegrams, while Orton and other groups urged Congress to enact
legislation to protect these messages. 171 Representative James A. Garfield,
who went on to serve as the twentieth President of the United States, noted
that the telegraph is, "next to the post office, the custodian of more secrets
in relation to public and private affairs than any other institution on earth,"
and urged Congress not to require Western Union to turn over the requested
telegrams. 172 On the other side, Senator Roscoe Conkling noted that the
process of sending a telegraph is akin to asking a third party to deliver an
oral message, and therefore one cannot expect that the message will be kept
private, and cannot complain if the government requires its disclosure. 173
Other members of Congress were similarly concerned that limiting access
to this evidence might unnecessarily burden criminal and other
investigations. 174 In a controversial action, Congress passed a resolution
requiring the telegraph managers to deliver the requested messages. 175
In response to this action, and to protect against disclosure going
forward, Western Union made arrangements to destroy messages after
delivery. 176 Although this would serve to protect their communications
165. See id.
166. See id at 47.
167. See, e.g., Secrets of the Telegraph, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1876, at 4.
168. See, e.g., Eavesdropping Extraordinary, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1874, at 4. Congress
also reviewed nearly three-quarters of a ton of stored messages to find evidence during its
investigation of the prominent financier Jay Cooke. Seipp, supra note 139, at 47-48.
169. See, e.g., Secrets of the Telegraph, supra, note 167.
170. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY, RULES, REGULATIONS, AND INSTRUCTIONS
55 (Cleveland 1866).
171. See Seipp, supra note 139, at 48-50.
172. 5 CONG. REC. 328 (1876) (statement of Rep. Garfield).
173. 5 CONG. REC. 445 (1877) (statement of Sen. Conckling).
174. See 5 CONG. REc. 477 (1877) (statement of Sen. Edmunds).
175. Id.; The Investigating Committees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1876, at 4; see also Seipp,
supra note 139, at 51-52.
176. Seipp, supra note 139, at 53. Currently, Internet companies are also considering
reducing the amount of time they store personally identifiable information. For example,
Yahoo! used to keep search logs for thirteen months but now only retains some personally
identifiable information for ninety days. See Press Release, Yahoo! Inc., Yahoo! Sets New
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from government review, businesses were opposed to this measure as it
would then be impossible to prove that Western Union had been responsible
for mistakes in transmission. 177 With some Western Union managers
facing imprisonment for failing to comply with congressional demands,
Western Union ultimately did not destroy the messages, and complied with
the requests. 178
Eventually, prominent legal commentators like Judge Thomas M.
Cooley, began to suggest that the rationale underlying finding strong Fourth
Amendment protections for postal mail was equally applicable to
communications by telegraph. 179 Judge Cooley also expressed his view
that the law cannot limit the protection afforded to telegraph users on the
theory that they could send their messages by other means. 180 Telegraph
use, and the need for quick communication, had become so important that
Judge Cooley remarked, "Neither is the use of the telegraph a matter of
mere choice. Business transactions cannot be successfully carried on
without resort to its facilities, and the exigencies of family communication
are daily demanding the most speedy transmission of messages that shall be
found possible." 181  With these considerations in mind, Judge Cooley
concluded that "the right to have telegraphic communication protected, as
that by mail is, seems unquestionable." 182 Notably, because of how they
are transmitted, telegraph messages were, as Senator Conkling noted, far
more akin to asking a third party to deliver a message than depositing a
sealed letter with the post office. 183
Western Union proposed a bill to protect telegraphic messages to the
same extent as postal mail, and, although the bill was favorably reported out
of committee, it was never passed. 184  Congress kept its authority to
demand messages from the telegraph companies but limited its subpoenas
to particular and germane messages.' 8 5  Later state and federal cases
considering the validity of government subpoenas only considered the
statutory protections for telegraph messages and did not consider whether
Industry Privacy Standard with Data Retention Policy (Dec. 17, 2008),
http://yhoo.client.shareholder.com/press/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=354703; see also
Miguel Helft, Yahoo Puts New Limits on Keeping User Data, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 2008, at
B3.
177. Seipp, supra note 139, at 53.
178. Id. at 54.
179. Thomas M. Cooley, Inviolability of Telegraphic Correspondence, 27 AM. L. REG.
65, 71 (1879); see also Seipp, supra note 139, at 55.
180. Cooley, supra note 179, at 71.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 73. Judge Cooley remarked, "[i]f the [telegraph] operator can be compelled to
produce them, then on the same reasons a postmaster may be brought into court and
compelled to produce the undelivered postal cards for examination." Id. at 77.
183. Cf supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
184. Woods & Bradley v. Frank Miller & Co., 7 N.W. 484, 484 (Iowa 1880) (noting that
"[t]he contents of [telegraph] messages, unlike the contents of letters, are necessarily known
to the persons engaged in transmitting them"); H.R. REP. No. 46-1262, at 1 (2d Sess. 1880);
Seipp, supra note 139, at 57-58.
185. Seipp, supra note 139, at 58.
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they were protected under the Fourth Amendment. These decisions
concluded that, although telegraph messages were not entitled to the same
level of protection as mail, the subpoenas requesting telegraph messages
must at least specify the telegram by date and subject. 186
Several states later adopted laws forbidding the tapping and interception
of telegraph messages, and by 1909 thirty states had adopted laws
forbidding employees of private telegraph companies from disclosing
messages to anyone other than the intended recipient. 187 However, these
laws either explicitly exempted judicial subpoenas, or were interpreted to
include such exceptions by the courts. 188  With the invention and
widespread adoption of the telephone, telegraph use soon dropped. With
decreased use, concern over government and third-party seizure of
telegrams also diminished, leaving the issue unresolved. 189
This issue arose before the Supreme Court adopted the two-part Katz
test, 190 and the Court never decided whether telegraph messages were
protected by the Fourth Amendment. But, even where telegraph operators
reviewed the entire contents of the telegrams they transmitted, members of
the public still expected these messages to be kept private and were
outraged at government review of these communications.1 91 Commentators
at the time, like Judge Cooley, argued that telegraphs were the modem day
analogue of postal mail, and as such, should be given the same protections
of the Fourth Amendment. 192
Modem-day electronic communications share some similarities with the
way in which telegraph messages were transmitted, though e-mail messages
are not nearly as exposed to the carriers as telegraph messages were. 19 3
The strong opposition to leaving telegraph messages unprotected further
supports finding that e-mail and other electronic communications are
protected under the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the experience with
telegraph messages also highlights the importance of extending strong
constitutional protections to new and important modes of communication.
186. Id. at 58-59; see In re Storror, 63 F. 564, 567-68 (N.D. Cal. 1894); United States v.
Hunter, 15 F. 712, 714-15 (N.D. Miss. 1882); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Bierhaus, 36 N.E. 161,
162-63 (Ind. App. 1894); Exparte Jaynes, 12 P. 117, 117 (Cal. 1886); Exparte Brown, 72
Mo. 83, 95 (1880); Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Bank, 7 W. Va. 544, 546-47 (1874); State v.
Litchfield, 58 Me. 267, 269-70 (1870).
187. Seipp, supra note 139, at 93-94; see also ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
337 (1967).
188. E.g., Woods & Bradley, 7 N.W. at 484-85; Exparte Brown, 7 Mo. App. 484, 491-
92 (1879); Seipp, supra note 139, at 94.
189. Currently, no reported decisions appear to consider the use of telegraph messages in
criminal prosecutions. Given the state of the art, it is unlikely this issue will ever be
resolved. Cf Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of
Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REv. 553, 583-84 (2007).
190. See supra notes 20, 23-28 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 31.
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C. Legislative Actions To Protect Electronic Communications
In the 1980s, as electronic communications became increasingly widely
used, legislators grew concerned that the existing Fourth Amendment and
statutory framework left these new media vulnerable to government and
private interception, and sought to enact legislation to protect them. 194
Although the 1968 Wiretap Act was only eighteen years old when the
ECPA was enacted, commentators noted that the old Wiretap Act was
already obsolete, and this new action was necessary to protect the
important, emerging field of electronic communications. 195
1. Motivation for the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
At the request of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, and the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) 196 created a report summarizing the current protections available to
electronic communications. 197  The OTA Report found that current
protections for electronic mail were "weak, ambiguous, or nonexistent," 198
and concluded that "[t]he existing statutory framework and judicial
interpretations thereof do not adequately cover new and emerging electronic
surveillance technologies."' 199 In part because of the Supreme Court's
treatment of information conveyed to third parties, when Congress enacted
the ECPA it was unclear whether users maintained reasonable expectations
of privacy in remotely stored files such that they would be protected under
the Fourth Amendment.200 Consequently, Congress wanted to ensure that
these communications could not be freely seized. 201
The OTA Report began by noting that "[a]lthough the principle of the
fourth amendment is timeless, its application has not kept abreast of current
194. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearing on H.R. 3378 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 11 (1986) (letter from Sen. Patrick Leahy to Honorable William
French Smith, Att'y Gen. of the United States (Jan. 26, 1984)); see also New Law To Protect
Consumer Data Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1985, at A18.
195. See Linda Greenhouse, The Wiretapping Law Needs Some Renovation, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 1986, at E4.
196. The Office of Technology Assessment was a nonpartisan agency established in 1972
to assist Congress with complex and highly technical issues that affect society. The office
closed in September 1995 when Congress withdrew funding. See The OTA Legacy,
http://www.princeton.edu/-ota/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2009).
197. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-293, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1985)
[hereinafter OTA REPORT].
198. Id. at 29.
199. Id. at 10.
200. See Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator's Guide To Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 (2004); see also
supra notes 20, 23-28 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 78
2009] PROTECTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 373
technologies." 20 2 The report discussed government surveillance of several
different methods of electronic communications, and recognizes the
increasing importance of e-mail. 20 3 The report also noted that in attempting
to define the level of protection that should be afforded to new
technologies, it is helpful to compare to them to their pre-electronic
analogues. 20 4 In the case of e-mail, the report concluded that the analogue
is first class mail, which is afforded strong Fourth Amendment
protections. 205
In spite of the inherent unpredictability of the Katz test, and the possible
applicability of the third-party doctrine, the report concluded that a sender's
messages will likely be protected by the Fourth Amendment while stored on
her computer or in her remote electronic mailbox.20 6  Similarly, the
recipient would also enjoy protection under the Fourth Amendment while
the message is stored either in an electronic mailbox on his personal
computer or in an electronic mailbox on his e-mail provider's server. 207
Although the report concluded that the existing constitutional and statutory
framework did not protect messages while in transit, 208 it recognized that
the information conveyed in these messages may be personal and that, in
general, individuals expect that the contents will remain private among the
group with whom they are communicating. 20 9 The OTA Report also
considered that, as a practical matter, e-mail providers have access to the
communications and frequently retain copies of messages in their databases
for backup protection and billing purposes. 2 10 After Miller, the OTA
Report noted that these additional copies may limit an individual's Fourth
Amendment protections. 2 11
The OTA Report proposed three possible paths for Congress to pursue:
(1) legislate to ensure e-mail has the same degree of protection as first class
mail; (2) give protection to the message while in the sender's and
recipient's electronic mailboxes, but not specifically legislate to define the
protection afforded during transmission, and instead rely on the existing
aural limitation in Title III; or (3) wait to see how the e-mail market and
202. OTA REPORT, supra note 197, at 3. The report noted that, although the Katz
standard for determining the extent of Fourth Amendment protections is broad and flexible,
reasonable expectation of privacy is "nebulous" and predicting its meaning in new contexts
is difficult. Id. at 17-18.
203. See id. at 45-46.
204. See id. at 51; cf notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
205. See OTA REPORT, supra note 197, at 51; see also supra notes 136-37, 147-48 and
accompanying text.
206. See OTA REPORT, supra note 197, at 48-49.
207. See id. at 48-50. Although the report recognized the limited protection for records
stored by third parties after Miller, it did not find that it worked to reduce an individual's
expectation of privacy in her electronic communications. See id. at 50; cf supra notes 65-75.
208. See OTA REPORT, supra note 197, at 49.
209. See id at 50.
210. See id.
211. See id.; SLOBOGIN, supra note 89, at 153; see also supra Part I.A.2.
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case law develop to see if any action is necessary. 212 Under any approach,
the OTA Report recognized that intercepting a large quantity of e-mail may
constitute a fishing expedition 213 and that, regardless of where it is
intercepted, because the communications are electronic and there are in
effect an infinite number of "copies," it may be difficult or impossible for
the user to tell if a message has been seized. 214 The report also concluded
that "given the high threat to civil liberties posed by interception of
electronic mail ... the governmental interest in interception would have to
be quite compelling" to justify interception. 215
At a subcommittee hearing, Representative from Wisconsin and
Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee Robert Kastenmeier noted
that "new modes of communication have outstripped the legal protection
provided under statutory definitions bound by old technologies. The
unfortunate result is that the same technologies that hold such promise for
the future also enhance the risk that our communications will be intercepted
by either private parties or the Government. ' 216  Representative
Kastenmeier went on to say that "Congress needs to act to ensure that the
new technological equivalents of telephone calls, telegrams, and mail are
afforded the same protection provided to conventional communications. '" 217
Senator Patrick Leahy also participated in developing the ECPA, and during
the hearing recognized that, although we may have shifted to a new form of
communication, the public's privacy interest in its communications has not
changed. 218 Senator Leahy remarked that the "rules don't change at all.
The technology changes. All the legislation does is to make sure that the
rules stay consistent with the technology." 219
Introducing the ECPA to the House of Representatives, Representative
Kastenmeier explained that the "Act updates existing Federal wiretapping
law to take into account new forms of electronic communications such as
electronic mail, cellular telephones, and data transmission by providing
such communications with protection against improper interception."' 220
The Act was designed to provide broad protection in this quickly evolving
and largely unknown field, and Representative Kastenmeier justified the
broad scope by explaining that "[a]ny attempt to write a law which tries to
212. See OTA REPORT, supra note 197, at 51-52.
213. See id. at 50; cf supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
214. See OTA REPORT, supra note 197, at 51; cf Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (anticipating technology would evolve to permit
"the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, [to] reproduce them in
court").
215. See OTA REPORT, supra note 197, at 51.
216. Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Hearing on H.R. 3378 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1986) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
217. Id. at2.
218. Id. at 18 (statement of Sen. Leahy, Vice Chairman S. Select Comm. on Intelligence).
219. Id.
220. 132 CONG. REc. 14,885 (1986) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
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protect only those technologies which exist in the marketplace today ... is
destined to be outmoded within a few years." 22 1  Although focused on
electronic communications, the act recognized that the goal was to protect
the "sanctity and privacy of the communication" itself.2 22  Despite its
attempt to protect communications broadly, commentators have noted that
the ECPA's provisions are narrow, and that it is not a "catch-all" designed
to provide general protections to all computers and computer networks. 223
The ECPA enjoyed strong support from both the House and the Senate,
and from industry and the public when it was enacted. 224 The OTA report
and statements from the bill's sponsors all suggest that Congress sought to
provide broad protection to electronic communications so that they were at
least as strongly protected as traditional forms of communication such as
first class mail and telephone calls. 2 25
2. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act Framework
The ECPA was enacted in 1986, amending Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,226 and has not been
significantly modified since. 227 The Act contains three main sections:
Title I protects wire, oral, and electronic communications while in transit
(Wiretap Act);2 28 Title II contains the Stored Communications Act (SCA),
which protects communications held in electronic storage; 229 and Title III
restricts the use of pen registers (Pen Register Act).230 The section relevant
to the protection of e-mails, text messages, and other forms of electronic
communications is Title II-the SCA. 2 3 1 Even though the statute would
221. Id. at 14,886.
222. Id. Senator Leahy worked with Representative Kastenmeier to craft the bill and,
recognizing the importance of protecting communications, noted that "the law must advance
with the technology to ensure the continued vitality of the fourth amendment." S. Rep. No.
99-541, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559.
223. See Kerr, supra note 200, at 1214-15.
224. See 132 CONG. REc. 14,886 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); New Law To Protect
Computer Data Sought, supra note 194; Houses Approves Privacy Measure To Help
Electronic Communications, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1986, at 71. However, some
commentators writing shortly after the bill was enacted noted that the protection accorded
was not as broad as it appeared at first glance. See, e.g., Robert Corn, New Law Offers Easy
Listening, THE NATION, Dec. 20, 1986, at 696.
225. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
226. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C §§ 2510-22, 2701-12, 3121-27 (2006)).
227. The most significant changes were caused by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.), but this did not modify the protections afforded to electronic communications at
issue in this Note.
228. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22.
229. Id. §§ 2701-12.
230. Id. §§ 3121-27.
231. Most circuit courts to address this issue found that in order for the Wiretap Act to
apply, the communication must be intercepted contemporaneously with transmission. See
Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878
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seem to be quite important and it is frequently used, commentators have
noted that the "statute is dense and confusing, and few cases exist
explaining how the statute works." 232
The SCA imposes a fine or imprisonment for any intentional access to a
facility where electronic communication service is provided, but does not
apply to conduct authorized by the person or entity providing the service.2 33
The SCA differentiates between providers of "Electronic Communication
Service" (ECS), "which provides to users thereof the ability to send or
receive wire or electronic communications," 234 and "Remote Computing
Service" (RCS), which is characterized by "the provision to the public of
computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic
communications system." 235 When the SCA was passed, computers were
far more expensive and far less powerful than they are today. In addition to
using third-party service providers to send and receive messages, some also
outsourced what may now be considered to be basic computer tasks,
including processing and file storage. 236 However, as the services provided
continue to expand and evolve, the delineation between ECS and RCS
providers has blurred. 237
The SCA generally prevents both ECS and RCS providers from
disclosing data in electronic storage, but has an important exception for
electronic messages stored by an RCS. The statute clarifies that the
government may only obtain the contents of an electronic communication
that has been in storage with an ECS for less than 180 days pursuant to a
warrant. 238 However, the government does not need a warrant supported
by probable cause to obtain communications maintained in an ECS that are
(9th Cir. 2002). But see United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 79 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
banc). In United States v. Councilman, the SCA was arguably inapplicable because the e-
mail had been intercepted by the user's ISP and fell within the statutory exemption. 418 F.3d
at 81. Sitting en banc, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that
Congress intended "electronic communication" to be defined broadly to cover transient
electronic storage and the interception of e-mail in such storage. Id. at 85.
232. Kerr, supra note 200, at 1208. Kerr also notes that "[tihe uncertainty has made it
difficult for legislators to legislate in the field, reporters to report about it, and scholars to
offer scholarly guidance in this very important area of law." ld.
233. 18 U.S.C. § 2701.
234. Id. § 2510(15). "Existing telephone companies and electronic mail companies are
providers of electronic communication services." S. REP. No. 99-541, at 14 (1986), as
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568. In the simplest case, a commercial ISP acts as
an ECS for unopened e-mail sitting on its server. See Kerr, supra note 200, at 1216.
235. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2). For example, a provider that allows users to upload files for
remote storage would be an RCS under the statute. See Kerr, supra note 200, at 1216.
236. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557. Although
increasingly sophisticated computers have decreased the need for consumers to rely on
external sites for data processing and storage, many have begun to once again store records
on remote servers and are increasingly using "cloud computers" for processing because of
their convenience. See, e.g., Let it Rise, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2008, at 1, 1-2.
237. See Kerr, supra note 200, 1216-17.
238. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). The government must obtain a warrant because the contents
are believed to be protected by the Fourth Amendment. H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 68 (1986).
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more than 180 days old or to obtain communications stored in an RCS. 2 3 9
The government may use either an administrative subpoena, if authorized
by statute, or a court order to obtain this information. 240 A court order only
requires "specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation," which is less than is required to establish probable cause and
obtain a warrant. 24 1 There is no requirement that the government specify
the type of messages it is seeking or the date of the messages. Although the
government is required to give notice to the subscriber, 24 2 it may delay
notice for ninety days where there is reason to believe that notification may
have an "adverse result. ' 243 And, if the government does elect to procure a
warrant, then it is not required to give notice to the subscriber at all. 244
Section 2703 of the SCA also requires ECS and RCS providers to disclose
the name, address, method of payment, and other information about
subscribers when subpoenaed.245
When enacting the ECPA, Congress found that "[m]ost-if not all-
electronic communications systems. .. only keep copies of messages for a
few months." 2 46  The Committee concluded that beyond this point, the
storage is more akin to that of business records maintained by a third party,
which are accorded less protection. 247 This is in part because when the Act
was drafted, users generally needed to take affirmative steps to move e-mail
messages they wanted to preserve into storage in order for e-mail providers
to save them beyond 180 days. 248 Professor Deirdre Mulligan of Boalt Hall
School of Law suggests that this practical reality of e-mail use at the time is
important in reconciling Congress's reference to providing "first-class mail-
like protections" to e-mail, and the distinction between e-mail less than 180
days old and greater than 180 days old.24 9 This also helps explain why
communications greater than 180 days old are only afforded the same
protection as records stored in a remote server. 2 50
239. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).
240. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B).
241. Id. § 2703(d). The court may quash or modify the order on motion from the provider
if the "records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such order
otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider." Id.
242. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B).
243. Id. § 2705(a); see also id § 2705(a)(2) (defining "adverse result").
244. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(A).
245. Id. § 2703(c)(2).
246. H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 68 (1986). The Committee chose 180 days because it
found that electronic communications providers generally retained e-mail for six months.
Mulligan, supra note 31, at 1584.
247. H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 68. This does not appear to account for the fact that the
record keeper was not the intended recipient of the message and probably did not look at the
records.
248. See Mulligan supra, note 3 1, at 1584.
249. See id. at 1584-85.
250. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b); see also supra note 239 and accompanying text. While
internally consistent, this does not explain why remotely stored records are afforded less
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3. Internet Use After the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Internet and e-mail use have dramatically increased since the SCA came
into force. 25 1 More and more households have broadband Internet access in
their homes, 252 and a 2008 report found that nearly 70 percent of
Americans used Internet Webmail services, stored data and photos online,
or used online software programs. 253 The study found that in the eighteen-
to twenty-nine-year-old age group, 77 percent of users surveyed used a
Webmail service.2 54 49 percent of users surveyed stated they would be
"very concerned" if their providers allowed law enforcement to access their
files when requested to do so. 15 percent would be "somewhat" concerned,
and 11 percent would be "not too" concerned. 2 55 However, 22 percent
stated they would be "not at all" concerned if the government were allowed
access.
2 5 6
In addition to its increased use, e-mail is routinely held on providers'
servers for increasing periods of time, and, in some cases, even indefinitely.
For example, several companies, including Google, offer free Webmail
service. When Google launched its Webmail service, GMail, in 2004, it
provided users with one gigabyte of storage for free. 2 57 Now, just five
years later, GMail users have over seven and a half gigabytes of storage
available, and that amount is continually increasing. 258 With so much
space at their disposal, users are encouraged not to delete their messages,
but to archive them so that they are always available and always
protection than electronic records stored on premises. Cf, e.g., United States v.
Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding legitimate expectation of privacy
in personal computer in dorm room connected to university network); United States v.
Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (discussing privacy interest in personal
computer).
251. See generally PEW INTERNET, INTERNET: THE MAINSTREAMING OF ONLINE LIFE 59
(2005), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2005/lntemet
Status_2005.pdf.pdf (discussing increase in Internet use between 2000 and 2004 and how
the "Web has become the 'new normal' in the American way of life").
252. See generally PEW INTERNET, HOME BROADBAND ADOPTION 2008 (2008), available
at http://www.pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2008/PIP Broadband_2008.pdf.
253. See generally PEW INTERNET, USE OF CLOUD COMPUTING APPLICATIONS AND
SERVICES SEPTEMBER 2008 1 (2008), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/
-/media//Files/Reports/2008/PIP_Cloud.Memo.pdf.pdf.
254. See id. at 5.
255. See id at 7.
256. See id. This survey is not immediately applicable to determining whether a search is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the respondents would likely factor in
whether they had any potentially incriminating information in their accounts when assessing
how concerned they, personally, would be if law enforcement were allowed to access their
accounts. However, for a more detailed discussion of societal expectations of privacy, see
SLOBOGIN, supra note 89.
257. This was nearly five hundred times the space provided on comparable free services
at the time. See David Pogue, What Big Brother? Gmail from Google Wins a Fan, Despite
Its Ads Review, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 15, 2004, at 16; Katie Hafner, In Google We
Trust? When the Subject Is E-mail, Maybe Not, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004, at G 1.
258. See Posting of Rob Siemborski to Official Gmail Blog, http://gmailblog
.blogspot.con/2007/l 0/more-gmail-storage-coming-for-all.html (Oct. 12, 2007, 1:05 EST).
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searchable. 259 Irrespective of the level of protection that should be afforded
to these messages, this use does not comport with Congress's general
perception of e-mail use when it drafted the SCA, particularly the
expectation that mail would rarely be retained for more than 180 days. 260
Although these servers store e-mail, they store it for the user, and there is
no indication that the providers read the private correspondence. 2 61
In addition to storing e-mail on remote servers, individuals are also
increasingly turning to third parties for remote file storage and backup. 262
Users generally expect the information stored remotely to be kept private,
and the providers also promise not to view the data stored on their
servers. 
263
Despite the changes in e-mail and computer use, the SCA has been
largely unmodified. In 2000, Representative Charles Canady introduced a
bill amending certain provisions of the 1986 ECPA, 264 and, although the
bill was favorably reported out of committee, 2 65 it was ultimately not
enacted. The proposed amendments included a number of changes, and,
relevant to electronic communications, would have required the government
to demonstrate probable cause before accessing location information for
cellular phones and to procure a warrant before accessing e-mail messages
greater than one year old--doubling the time required under the 1986
act.266 The report does not explain the significance of the change to one
year,2 67 but one year is still a far shorter period of time than the period for
which messages are typically retained. 268 More recently, the Constitution
Project, a coalition of twenty-five organizations and seventy-five
individuals interested in constitutional law, recommended that the President
and Congress take action to ensure Fourth Amendment protections for all
location information, all e-mail messages (regardless of how old they are),
and, additionally, for some user-generated content stored on remote
servers. 
269
259. Pogue, supra note 257 (noting "[o]ne gigabyte changes everything"); Hafner, supra
note 257.
260. Cf supra notes 246-48.
261. See, e.g., Does Google Read My Mail?, http://mail.google.com/supportfbin/
answer.py?answer=6599&topic = 12787 (last visited Aug. 20, 2009).
262. See Peter Wayner, You Know About Backups. Now, Do It Online., N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2008, at B7; David Pogue, Fewer Excuses For Not Doing a PC Backup, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
4, 2007, at C1.
263. See, e.g., Carbonite Online Backup, Data Security, http://cp-carbonite.kb.net/display
/4n/kb/article.aspx?aid=1061&searchstring=&n=&tab-browse&bt=4n&s = (last visited Aug.
20, 2009); Mozy.com, Decho Corporation Privacy Policy, http://mozy.com/privacy (last
visited Aug. 20, 2009).
264. H.R. 5018, 106th Cong. (2000).
265. See H.R. REP. No. 106-932, at 23 (2000).
266. H.R. 5018.
267. H.R. REP. No. 106-932, at 15.
268. Cf, e.g., supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
269. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, LIBERTY AND SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE NEXT ADMITNISTRATION AND CONGRESS 184-85 (2008), available at
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4. Protections Under State Law
In addition to the protections provided by federal law and under the U.S.
Constitution, several state legislatures have taken steps to protect electronic
communications. State constitutions also have a role to play. For example,
the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the New Jersey Constitution
provides broader protection in some cases than the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution.
In State v. Reid,270 the New Jersey Supreme Court found that under the
state constitution individuals have reasonable expectations of privacy in
their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, and law enforcement may not compel
disclosure of the subscriber information linked to an IP address from an ISP
without a grand jury subpoena. 271  In Reid, Shirley Reid's employer
discovered that someone had changed the company's shipping information
on a supplier's website in order to create a disruption and suspected Reid
might have been responsible. 272 The supplier provided the police with the
IP address used to make the modification, which the police used to trace
back to the ISP that controlled that IP address. 273 The police subpoenaed
all information pertaining to the IP address recorded at the time the
modification was made and discovered that Reid had been assigned that IP
address at the time the shipping information was changed.274
The court noted that the language of the Fourth Amendment is nearly
identical to its counterpart language in the New Jersey Constitution.275 The
court also acknowledged that, after the Supreme Court's decisions in Miller
and Smith, an individual cannot challenge the disclosure of this information
under the Fourth Amendment. 276 However, the court held that the New
Jersey Constitution offers broader protections than the U.S. Constitution. In
particular, the court relied on the fact that the state constitution had been
interpreted to protect disclosure of telephone numbers dialed or bank
records even though such disclosure is permissible under the U.S.
Constitution. 277
http://2009transition.org/liberty-security/index.php?option=com-docman&task=doe-
download&gid=49&Itemid=.
270. 945 A.2d 26 (N.J. 2008).
271. Id. at 28.
272. Id. at 29.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 29-30. IP addresses are unique addresses assigned to each computer
connected to the Internet. Most individuals connect to the Internet through an ISP that is
assigned a fixed range of IP addresses to distribute to its users. It is possible to look up
which ISP a particular IP address belongs to on a public service, but generally impossible to
determine the user with which a particular IP address is associated without contacting the
ISP. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262-63 (D. Nev. 2008); Reid,
945 A.2d at 29-30.
275. Reid, 945 A.2d at 31-32.
276. Id. (collecting cases).
277. Id. at 32 (citing State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866 (N.J. 2005) (bank records); State
v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982) (dialed telephone numbers)); cf supra notes 49, 65 and
accompanying text.
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The court found that subscriber information is analogous to bank records
and phone numbers dialed because, in all of these situations, individuals are
forced to turn the information in question over to the providers as part of
using the service. 278 The court noted that "when users surf the Web from
the privacy of their homes, they have reason to expect that their actions are
confidential." '2 79 Even though a decoded IP address does not allow access
to the contents of an individual's transactions on the Internet, it still may
reveal intimate details about personal affairs, such as where the person
shops or in which political organizations he or she is involved. 280 In light
of these concerns, the court held that individuals were entitled to the same
level of protection for their subscriber information as for phone and banking
records. 28
1
Several other states also recognize the privacy interest in subscriber
information, and Minnesota and Nevada both have enacted statutes
prohibiting disclosure of personal subscriber information without
consent. 282 No state appears to have legislated to define whether an ISP
may monitor an individual's Internet use, but Connecticut and Delaware
both prohibit employers from monitoring their employees' Internet and e-
mail use without first giving them notice. 28
3
While Reid did not consider the level of protection afforded to the
contents of e-mail communications, subscriber information is generally
afforded less protection than information that reveals the content of an
individual's correspondence. 284 The flexibility in construing language
nearly identical to that contained in the U.S. Constitution, combined with
the recognition of the sensitivity of information that can be culled from
these databases, suggests that the contents of electronic communications
would almost certainly be protected under the New Jersey Constitution.
This approach also casts doubt on the wisdom of the Court's earlier
decisions in Smith and Miller and, in particular, raises questions about
whether their reach should be extended to cover electronic communications
stored in remote databases. 285
278. Reid, 945 A.2d at 33.
279. Id.
280. Id. (citing Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Internet Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1287 (2004)).
281. Id. at 33-34.
282. MrNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325M.01-09 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.498
(LexisNexis 2006); see also National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws Related
to Internet Privacy, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/eprivacylaws.htm (last visited
Aug. 20, 2009).
283. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705
(2005); see also National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 282. For a humorous
look at e-mail monitoring in the workplace, see The Office: E-mail Surveillance (NBC
television broadcast Nov. 22, 2005).
284. Cf, e.g., supra notes 129-32, 151-53 and accompanying text.
285. But see generally Kerr, supra note 34 (advocating for retaining the broad third-party
doctrine).
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1I. DIFFERENT LEVELS OF PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Although Congress sought to broadly protect electronic communications
with the SCA, it did not give Fourth Amendment-like protections to all
electronic communications. Two recent cases that considered the level of
constitutional protection afforded to electronic communications have
concluded that the messages are protected by the Fourth Amendment
irrespective of how long they have been stored. Because § 2703(b) of the
SCA permits the government to access electronic communications greater
than 180 days old with a showing of less than probable cause, these cases
suggest that the statute provides an unconstitutionally low level of
protection.
A. The Stored Communications Act in Action
Under the SCA, government agents may only obtain electronic
communications less than 180 days old pursuant to a warrant issued by a
court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation. 286 However, §
2703(b) permits law enforcement to obtain documents in storage for more
than 180 days with just a subpoena or court order.287 Under this section,
the government does not need to establish probable cause, but must only
"offer[] specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication,
or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation. '288 Additionally, the government may
delay notifying the individual whose communications are being monitored
by up to ninety days.289
In Warshak v. United States,290 law enforcement used the SCA to obtain
court orders directing the defendant's ISPs to turn over all of the
defendant's messages greater than 180 days old stored on their servers. 291
The order prohibited the providers from informing Warshak about the
search and allowed the government to delay notifying Warshak for ninety
days. 292 However, where users have reasonable expectations of privacy in
messages stored on their ISP's server, these communications are protected
under the Fourth Amendment and law enforcement must generally obtain a
warrant before they may review them. 293 If these messages are protected
under the Fourth Amendment, the provision in § 2703(b) of the SCA that
allows access to communications greater than 180 days old, without first
286. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006).
287. Id. § 2703(b).
288. Id. § 2703(d).
289. Id. § 2705.
290. 490 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008)
(finding claim was not ripe for judicial review).
291. Id. at 460.
292. Id
293. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
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demonstrating probable cause and securing a warrant, conflicts with the
Constitution's requirements. 294
B. Applying the Fourth Amendment to Electronic Communications
When applying legal rules to the Internet, Professor Orin Kerr points out
that courts and lawyers have two choices: they can either take the
perspective of a user and try to draw analogies between "realspace" and
cyberspace, or take an external perspective and apply the law to the
transactions underlying the network's operation. 295 In the Internet context,
the different perspectives may lead to particularly divergent results, because
a user may be fully immersed in the network, but have no idea of its inner
workings.2 96  For example, from a user's perspective, e-mail is the
equivalent of postal mail, and should thus be entitled to the same high
standard of Fourth Amendment protection. 297 However, from an external
perspective, that same message is stored on both the recipient's computer
and the sender's computer and may have been transmitted between two
different ISPs, either of which may have also retained a copy. 298 From this
perspective, Fourth Amendment protections are less clear.299
Some early decisions to address the protection afforded to electronic
communications placed considerable emphasis on the technical details of
how electronic messages are transported and delivered. 300 For example, in
United States v. Councilman,30 1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit engaged in an in-depth review of how e-mail is transmitted between
computers.302 Although such a highly technical analysis is not required
under the Katz test focusing on reasonableness, 30 3 even courts considering
the technical details of how an electronic message is transmitted have found
that a third party's limited interaction with a message during delivery does
not limit the Fourth Amendment protections.
In Warshak v. United States, a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that e-mail messages were protected
under the Fourth Amendment in spite of the third-party ISP's limited
access. 304 More recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
294. Cf 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a)-(b).
295. Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 359-60
(2003).
296. Id. at 362.
297. Id at 365-66; cf Cooley, supra note 179, at 73 (drawing an analogy between
telegrams and postal mail).
298. Kerr, supra note 295, at 366; cf Wikipedia, E-Mail, supra note 30.
299. See Kerr, supra note 295, at 366-67.
300. See, e.g., Saul Hansell, You've Got Mail (and Court Says Others Can Read It), N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2004, at C1.
301. 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
302. See id. at 69-70.
303. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
304. 490 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008)
(finding claim was not ripe for judicial determination); see infra Part II.B. 1.
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concluded in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co.305 that individuals have
reasonable expectations of privacy in their text messages and that those
messages are, therefore, also protected by the Fourth Amendment. 30 6
Additionally, in other analogous areas, courts have found that a third party's
limited access to some part of an electronic communication does not
eliminate all Fourth Amendment protections, further supporting the
decisions in Warshak and Quon.30 7 However, these decisions conflict with
§ 2703(b) of the SCA, which is premised on the concept that electronic
communications stored by third parties are not protected under the Fourth
Amendment.
1. E-mail: Warshak v. United States
While investigating Steven Warshak and Berkeley Premium
Nutraceuticals, Inc.-the company Warshak controlled-for mail and wire
fraud, money laundering, and other federal offenses, the government
obtained an order from a magistrate judge under § 2703 of the SCA that
required Warshak's ISPs to turn over all "electronic communications (not in
electronic storage unless greater than 181 days old) that were placed or
stored in directories or files owned or controlled by Warshak. '' 30 8 The
court issued the orders under seal and prohibited the ISPs from informing
Warshak. 30 9 Over a year after the orders issued, the government finally
informed Warshak about the orders. 310
In addition to challenging the use of the messages as evidence, because
the government failed even to comply with the delayed notice provisions
contained in the SCA, Warshak also raised a Fourth Amendment challenge
to the search of these messages. 311 Writing for a unanimous panel of the
Sixth Circuit, Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. found that the reasonable
expectation of privacy question must "focus on two narrower questions than
the general fact that the communication was shared with another. ' 312 First,
courts need to "identify the party with whom the communication is
shared. ' 313 Second, courts must consider the precise information conveyed
to the party from whom disclosure is sought. 314
The court recognized that the depositor in Miller and the caller in Smith
had assumed the risk that the bank and phone company might disclose the
305. 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008).
306. Id. at 903; see infra Part II.B.2.
307. See infra Part II.B.3.
308. Warshak, 490 F.3d at 460.
309. Id. Identical orders were presented to NuVox Communications and Yahoo!, where
Warshak held e-mail accounts. Id.
310. Id. at 460-61.
311. Id. at461.
312. Id. at 470.
313. Id.
314. Id.; cf Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 340 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the difference between disclosing information to one person and to the general
public).
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information they had voluntarily conveyed to them.3 15 However, the panel
concluded that the "assumption of risk" is limited to the information
actually conveyed to the provider, which, in the context of a phone
conversation, does not include the content of the call. 3 16 This distinction
led the court to hold that the third-party exception only permits the
government to compel disclosure of the specific information to which the
third party had access. 3 17 "It cannot, on the other hand, bootstrap an
intermediary's limited access to one part of the communication (e.g. the
phone number) to allow it access to another part (the content of the
conversation)." 3 18 Even though the "ISP could access the content of e-
mails and phone calls, the privacy expectation in the content of either is not
diminished, because there is a societal expectation that the ISP or the phone
company will not do so as a matter of course." 3 19 Consistent with the third-
party doctrine, the court noted there would be no Fourth Amendment
violation if the government subpoenaed the recipient of the e-mails. 320
However, here, the government subpoenaed the ISP, which was "not
expected to access the content of the documents, much like the phone
company in Katz."'321
Even though the court found that Warshak did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his e-mails, it did not declare the statute
unconstitutional. The court instead issued an injunction prohibiting the
government from compelling disclosure of e-mails unless it first obtained a
warrant, provided notice to the account holder, and allowed him the same
judicial review he would have if subpoenaed. 322 Alternatively, the order
allowed the government to simply subpoena the e-mails if it could show
"specific, articulable facts, demonstrating that an ISP or other entity has
complete access to the e-mails in question and that it actually relies on and
utilizes this access in the normal course of business, sufficient to establish
that the user has waived his expectation of privacy with respect to that
entity." 323
On rehearing en banc, a majority of the Sixth Circuit found the issue was
not fit for judicial review as it was unclear whether the government
intended to perform further ex parte review of Warshak's e-mail. 324 The
majority also noted that the lack of Fourth Amendment challenges to the
SCA since its inception in 1986 further validated the court's decision not to
address the Constitutional issue. 325 Except for this reference, the majority
315. Warshak, 490 F.3d at 470.
316. Id. at 471; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
317. Warshak, 490 F.3d at 471.
318. Id.
319. Id.; see also supra note 132 and accompanying text.
320. Warshak, 490 F.3d at 471.
321. Id.; cf supra note 261 and accompanying text.
322. Warshak, 490 F.3d at 475-76.
323. Id. at 476.
324. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2008) (en bane).
325. Id. at 531.
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did not discuss the panel's earlier conclusions regarding the
constitutionality of § 2703 of the SCA.326  In dissent, Judge Martin
remarked that "[i]nstead of reaching the question that is on everyone's
mind-whether or not the delayed notification provision of the Stored
Communications Act is constitutional-the majority sidesteps the
question." 327 Expressing his discontent with the majority's decision, Judge
Martin went on to speculate, "[I]f I were to tell James Otis and John Adams
that a citizen's private correspondence is now potentially subject to ex parte
and unannounced searches by the government without a warrant supported
by probable cause, what would they say? Probably nothing, they would be
left speechless. '328
Although the panel's initial decision is no longer in force, its reasoning
regarding the underlying constitutional issue is still persuasive. Taking an
internal perspective and accepting the validity of the Supreme Court's third-
party doctrine, the panel recognized that, although Warshak's messages
were stored in a commercial ISP's database, the ISP was not a party to the
communications and its limited interaction with the communications did not
vitiate Warshak's legitimate expectation of privacy in them.329
Recognizing that Warshak had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
messages would extend Fourth Amendment protections to them and render
§ 2703 of the SCA unconstitutional.
2. Text Messages: Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co..
More recently, in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., the Ninth Circuit
found that city employees have reasonable expectations of privacy in text
messages sent from pagers provided by their employers. 330 The city of
Ontario, California contracted with Arch Wireless for wireless text
messaging services, and distributed pagers to various city employees,
including Ontario Police Department Sergeants Jeff Quon and Steve
Trujillo. 331 The city lacked an official policy for the pagers but had a
general technology policy limiting the use of computer equipment to city-
related business. 332 The policy admonished that users "'should have no
expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources.' 333
326. See id. at 533.
327. Id. at 535 (Martin, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 538.
329. See supra notes 317-22 and accompanying text.
330. 529 F.3d 892, 903 (9th Cir. 2008). A similar issue appeared before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit several months before Quon in United States v. McCreary, No.
05-10818, 2008 WL 399148, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2008). The defendant in McCreary
challenged the government's use of § 2703 of the SCA to obtain transcripts of text messages
he sent. Id. However, the court found there was substantial independent evidence of
McCreary's guilt and did not reach the constitutional issue. Id
331. Quon, 529 F.3d at 895.
332. Id. at 896.
333. Id. (quoting the City of Ontario Computer Usage, Internet and E-Mail Policy).
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Each pager had a monthly character allotment under the contract, and the
city's unofficial policy was to refrain from auditing usage so long as the
users paid any overages. 334  However, as part of an internal affairs
investigation, city officials obtained transcripts of some officers' usage and
discovered personal and sexually explicit messages. 335 The officers and the
parties with whom they were communicating brought an action challenging
the police department's review of their messages under the Fourth
Amendment and the SCA. 336
The district court concluded that "electronic storage" as defined in the
SCA 33 7 included storage after transmission and that to read it more
narrowly and find it only covers pretransmission storage would undermine
the purpose of the SCA.338 The court then denied Arch Wireless's motion
to dismiss the claim, rejecting the argument that, because the sergeants were
not subscribers, they were not users of the system and not entitled to the
protections of the SCA. 339
The district court later granted the defendants' summary judgment
motion, finding that Arch Wireless was an RCS under § 2702(a) of the SCA
and committed no harm when it released the text message transcripts to its
subscriber, the city. 340 However, the district court found that, in light of the
informal policy that the officers' pager use would not be monitored if they
paid the overage charges, the officers had reasonable expectations of
privacy in the messages they sent.341
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded for further proceedings. 34 2 The court disagreed with the district
court's conclusion that Arch Wireless was acting as an RCS. 343 Although
an RCS may release private information with the consent of a subscriber,
addressee, or intended recipient, an ECS may only release the information
with the consent of the addressee or intended recipient. 344 The court looked
at the plain language of the SCA and its "common-sense definitions" and
found that Arch Wireless provided the city with electronic communication
services and not just remote storage, even though it retained backup copies
334. Id. at 897.
335. Id. at 898.
336. Id.
337. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2006).
338. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 309 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1209 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
339. Id. at 1209-10.
340. Quon, 529 F.3d at 898; Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1133,1138 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
341. Quon, 529 F.3d at 899. The district court then held a jury trial on the officers' intent
in reviewing the messages to determine if the review was reasonable, and the jury concluded
it was, absolving the police department of liability. Id.
342. Id. at 911.
343. Id. at 902-03.
344. Id. at 900.
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of the messages city employees transmitted. 345  Concluding that Arch
Wireless was acting as an ECS, the court found that it violated the SCA by
releasing the messages without consent from either the sender or the
intended recipient. 346
Most relevant for present purposes, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's determination that the users had reasonable expectations of privacy
in their text messages and that they were therefore protected by the Fourth
Amendment. 347 Even though the official department policy indicated that
the officers should not expect any privacy while using the department-
supplied technology, the court concluded that because Sergeant Quon had
in the past exceeded the character limit and his messages had not been
reviewed, the department followed an "informal policy" of not reviewing
messages. 348 Because the department did not review the messages, the
policy did not foreclose the officer's expectations of privacy. 349
Similar to the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in the panel decision in Warshak,
the court also recognized the distinction between Katz, which offered strong
protection for the content of a phone conversation, and Miller, which found
there was no protection for telephone numbers dialed, and held that the
content of the text messages was protected. 350 The court opined that the
fact "[tihat Arch Wireless may have been able to access the contents of the
messages for its own purposes is irrelevant" when determining the scope of
the user's privacy. 351  Because the parties "did not expect that Arch
Wireless would monitor their text messages, much less turn over the
messages to third parties without . . .consent," Arch Wireless's limited
access did not diminish the user's reasonable expectations of privacy. 352
The Court did, however, note that whether an expectation of privacy is
reasonable was a "context-sensitive" inquiry and, had Sergeant Quon
permitted the department to review his messages, none of the parties to the
conversations would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 353 In
345. Id. at 900-01. The Ninth Circuit also reached a similar result when it found that a
provider of e-mail services was an ECS even though it retained e-mails for backup
protection. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004).
346. Quon, 529 F.3d at 903.
347. Id. at 904.
348. Id. at 907; see also, e.g., Haynes v. Attorney Gen., No. 03-4209, 2005 WL 2704956,
at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2005) (discussing fact-specific inquiry to determine whether
employee had legitimate expectation of privacy and collecting cases).
349. Cf., e.g., United States v. Mosby, No. 08-CR-127, 2008 WL 2961316, at *5 (E.D.
Va. July 25, 2008).
350. Quon, 529 F.3d at 904-05. The Court also noted that there was no meaningful
difference between the text messages at issue and the e-mail messages at issue in United
States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008), where the Ninth Circuit concluded
that there was no privacy in the to/from address of e-mail messages because users should be
aware that information is available to ISPs for routing. Quon, 529 F.3d at 904-05.
351. Id. at 905.
352. Id. at 906.
353. Id. This is similar to the panel's decision in Warshak, which found that the
government may be able to access the messages from the ISP with just a court order or
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this case, in spite of the warnings not to expect privacy while using
department-supplied technology, because the police department followed a
policy of not auditing his messages as long as he paid the overage, the
Ninth Circuit agreed that Sergeant Quon had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the text messages. 354
Quon, like Warshak, recognized the limits of the third-party doctrine and
that a user's expectation of privacy was not eliminated merely because a
communication was stored on a third party's server. 355 Arch Wireless was
expected to provide text messaging services, including storing and
transmitting messages, but the parties did not expect that Arch Wireless
would review or disclose their private messages. 356 Unlike Hoffa speaking
to his associate, Arch Wireless was not a party to the conversations, but
merely a storage facility, and the users did not assume the risk that they
would disclose their messages. 357
3. Protection for Other Electronic Information
a. Information Held by, but Not Directed to, Third Parties
As the Supreme Court recognized in Katz, the mere fact that a
conversation is shared with another does not eliminate all Fourth
Amendment protections. 358 In the electronic communications context, both
Quon and the panel opinion in Warshak recognized that individuals have
reasonable expectations of privacy in electronic communications, even
where the communications pass through third-party intermediaries who
could theoretically review the contents of the communications. 359 In this
situation, practice and societal expectations indicate that the service
providers, like the phone company in Katz, will not review the
communications. 360
However, consistent with Katz's mandate that information voluntarily
exposed to the public is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection, 36 1
several courts have found that an individual does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her personal, subscriber information conveyed to
subpoena if the ISP had a practice of reviewing the messages. See Warshak v. United States,
490 F.3d 455, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
354. Quon, 529 F.3d at 906. The court also rejected the police department's argument
that Sergeant Quon lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy because the California Public
Records Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6253 (West 2008), makes public records open to
inspection by the public. Quon, 529 F.3d. at 907.
355. See supra Part II.B. 1-2.
356. See Quon, 529 F.3d at 905-06.
357. Cf United States v. Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
358. See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
359. See supra Part II.A-B.
360. See supra Part IIA-B.
361. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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an ISP. 362 Law enforcement officers are often aware of the IP address 363
associated with a user engaging in illegal activity online, but must obtain
that user's subscriber information from the ISP in order to ascertain the
identity of the actual person linked to that IP address. 364 Several courts
have held that users do not have legitimate expectations of privacy in this
information because they voluntarily conveyed it to their third-party ISP,
and it is therefore not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 365 These courts
find that this information is akin to the bank records in Miller, which were
voluntarily turned over to the third party for its use and hence were not
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 366
Highlighting the difference between information simply made available
to a third party and information directed to a third party, some courts have
found that pen registers cannot be used to capture post-cut-through dialed
digits (PCTDD). 367  Frequently, individuals enter credit card, social
security, personal identification, or other numbers into a phone system in
response to prompts from an automated system at the other end of the line
after a call is connected. These PCTDDs can, in principle, be recorded by
pen registers. 368  In considering a request from law enforcement for
approval to use such a device, a court noted that although the phone
company certainly could view this information if it chose, unlike dialed
telephone numbers, which are used to connect a call and may show up on
an invoice, this information is not regularly recorded or processed by the
phone company. 369 Relying on the Sixth Circuit's panel decision in
Warshak, the court also noted that finding no expectation of privacy
wherever an intermediary merely has the potential to access information
would eviscerate important Fourth Amendment protections recognized
previously by the Supreme Court.370
362. E.g., United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at *4 (4th Cir.
Aug. 3, 2000); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000).
363. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
364. For example, in United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2008), the
government was able to locate an individual distributing pornography in an Internet chat
room by tracing the user's IP address back to his ISP and requiring the ISP to disclose the
user's true identity and address. Id. at 1199-200.
365. See, e.g., id. at 1204-05 (collecting cases). But cf supra notes 270-81 and
accompanying text.
366. See supra Part I.A.2; cf 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2006) (permitting law enforcement
to request subscriber information from ISPs).
367. E.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & a Trap &
Trace Device on Wireless Tel., No. 08 MC 0595, 2008 WL 5255815, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
16, 2008); In re U.S., Misc. Case No. H-07-613, 2007 WL 3036849, at *6-9 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
17, 2007); In re U.S. for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers & Trap & Trace
Devices, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
368. 515 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
369. Id. at 337.
370. Id. at 337-38. The court noted that even though it is not their usual practice, because
the telephone company has the ability to listen in to phone conversations, only considering
this factor would eliminate the Fourth Amendment protections for telephone calls that the
U.S. Supreme Court expressly noted existed in Katz. Id.; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 353 (1967).
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In addition to finding protection for information held by third parties but
not directed to them, some courts have held that individuals maintain
reasonable expectations of privacy in historical cell site information
recorded by their wireless providers. 37 1 Wireless providers record their
users' locations when their phones are active, and, by obtaining an
individual's historical cell site information, law enforcement officials can
track where an individual has been. 372 Some courts have concluded that,
even though cellular providers regularly store this information, users still
have reasonable expectations of privacy in it. 373  Even though this
information is stored in the provider's database where the provider could
access it, one court has recognized that because the provider would not
regularly as a matter of course review this information, let alone identify a
customer's location to a third party, users still have reasonable expectations
of privacy in this information. 374 These holdings go beyond the decisions
in Warshak and Quon because the cellular provider is not an intermediary
with respect to the historical cell site information, but actually the intended
recipient of it. These decisions suggest that information in the possession
of others is still private if it is not generally disclosed and appear to conflict
with the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Miller.37 5 However, both the
proposed 2000 amendments to the ECPA and the Constitution Project's
proposals advocate adopting Fourth Amendment-like protections for
historical location information-just as the courts in these cases have
found. 376
Although it was never the subject of a reported decision, even in the case
of telegraph communications-where an operator read and transmitted a
message to another operator who received and transcribed it-the public
still expected those communications to remain private. 377 Because of the
way the system worked, unlike telephone companies or ISPs, who merely
have the capability to review communications, here the operators were
actually privy to the content of the transmissions. 378 In spite of these
technical realities, many individuals still viewed these communications as
371. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov't, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 612 (W.D. Pa. 2008); In re Applications
of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d) to Disclose
Subscriber Info. and Historical Cell Site Info. for Mobile Identification Nos.: (XIXX) XXX-
AAAA, (XXX) XXX-BBBB, (XXX) XXX-CCCC, 509 F. Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D. Mass. 2007).
372. See Recent Development, Who Knows Where You've Been? Privacy Concerns
Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307,
310-11 (2004); see also Amy Harmon, Lost? Hiding? Your Cellphone Is Keeping Tabs,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at N1.
373. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 612; In re Applications of the
U.S. for Orders, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 74-75.
374. 509 F. Supp. 2d at 74 & n.6.
375. See supra Part I.A.2.
376. See supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
377. See supra Part I.B.3.
378. See COE, supra note 155, at 105-22; see also, e.g., Peterson v. W. Union Tel. Co.,
74 N.W. 1022, 1022 (Minn. 1898) (describing the process of sending a telegraph).
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private and were outraged at the possibility of government or other private
individuals reviewing their messages. 379
b. Information Reviewed by Third Parties
Conversely, an individual may not prevail on a Fourth Amendment
challenge where there is evidence demonstrating the provider or some other
party did regularly review the information in question. When considering
whether an individual has a privacy interest in electronic information on a
computer used at work, courts have been heavily influenced by the
employer's written policies regulating computer use. 380 For example, in
United States v. Mosby,38 1 the court found that, even though not enforced, a
policy that informed employees that their computer use was not private and
was subject to monitoring made any expectations of privacy the employees
had unreasonable. 382  In Warshak, the panel recognized that if the
government could demonstrate that it was the ISP's practice to review the
users' messages, then the third-party doctrine would apply, and the
government could access the messages with a subpoena. 383
In situations where communications are regularly reviewed, and users are
aware that their communications are not private, they may not have
legitimate expectations of privacy. 3 84 However, even where an official
policy instructs users not to expect privacy, courts still must engage in a
fact-based inquiry to determine whether an employee could have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in spite of such warnings. 385 In the case
of electronic communications, even where a provider's use policy purports
to limit an individual's privacy, courts still must consider what actually
takes place in order to determine whether an individual's expectation of
privacy is legitimate. 386 Where there is no use policy or other evidence
demonstrating the third party reviewed the user's communications, as was
the case in Quon and Warshak, these decisions hold that the third-party
service provider's limited access is not enough to bring the communications
379. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
380. E.g., United States v. Mosby, No. 3:08-CR-127, 2008 WL 2961316, at *5 (E.D. Va.
July 25, 2008).
381. 2008 WL 2961316.
382. Id. at *5. However, in United States v. Long, 64 M.J. 57 (C.A.A.F. 2006), the use
policy did not clearly indicate that employees should not expect privacy, and the court found
that the other circumstances surrounding the use, including regularly changing passwords,
contributed to a finding that the defendant did have an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in the system. 64 M.J. at 64; accord Haynes v. Attorney Gen., No. 03-4209, 2005
WL 2704956, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2005) (discussing fact-specific inquiry to determine
whether employee had legitimate expectation of privacy and collecting cases).
383. See Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en
banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding claim was not ripe for judicial determination).
384. E.g., Haynes, 2005 WL 2704956, at *4 (finding no expectation of privacy based on
"splash screen" that warned "that information flowing through or stored on the computer
could not be considered confidential").
385. E.g., Mosby, 2008 WL 2961316, at *5.
386. E.g., Haynes, 2005 WL 2704956, at *4.
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within the purview of the third-party doctrine and find an individual's
expectation of privacy is unreasonable. 387
III. SECTION 2703 OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED
As e-mail and other forms of electronic communications became more
widely used, Congress recognized their tremendous importance and grew
concerned that the existing statutory and constitutional framework was not
robust enough to adequately protect them for two main reasons. 388 First,
Congress was concerned about the unpredictability of which expectations of
privacy courts would recognize as reasonable and, therefore, sufficient to
satisfy the Katz test for determining the scope of Fourth Amendment
protections. 389 Second, Congress was unsure how the third-party doctrine
that evolved in Fourth Amendment analysis through the Supreme Court's
decisions in cases like Hoffa, Smith, and Miller would be applied. 390
However, when considered in light of this precedent, electronic
communications are still protected by the Fourth Amendment, as the
Warshak and Quon courts recognized. 391
The nature of the technology requires that electronic communications
will frequently bounce between several different servers controlled by third
parties during transmission, and these third-party servers may create backup
or archival copies of messages. 392 However, these intermediaries are not
parties to the conversations in the same way that the bank in Miller was,
and Quon and Warshak recognize that merely retaining a copy of the
message does not bring the communication within the purview of this
exception.393
In this situation, the provider is a fundamental part of the communication
process because it delivers the messages, but it is not an intended
recipient. 394 The provider's relationship with the message is not akin to the
situation in Hoffa, where Hoffa shared information with an associate
believing he would keep it confidential. 39 5 Here, although the provider
carries the message, the message is not directed to it.
This distinction between information carried by third parties and
information directed to third parties for their use is consistent with the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith, holding that individuals do not have
reasonable expectations of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial,
387. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
388. See supra Part I.C.1.
389. See supra notes 20, 23-28, 200, 206 and accompanying text.
390. See supra Part I.A.
391. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
392. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. In Quon, for example, the provider
retained copies of all the text messages it carried. See supra note 335 and accompanying
text.
393. Supra notes 315-22, 350-56 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 31-33, 81 and accompanying text.
395. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
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thereby permitting the government to request copies of a user's call history
from the phone company. 396 Dialing information is conveyed directly to
the phone company so that it may complete the phone call, and for the
purpose of this information, the phone company is the intended recipient
and is-like Hoffa's associate-free to disseminate this information to
whomever it chooses. 397  However, even though the content of the
conversation that takes place after the phone company uses the number
dialed to route and connect the call also passes through the phone
company's network, it is strongly protected under the Fourth
Amendment.398 This is because the content is not like the phone number
dialed and is not conveyed to the phone company for it to use.
Additionally, there is a strong societal expectation that the conversation will
be kept private. 399
The Supreme Court also recognized this distinction earlier when it
considered protections available for postal mail in Ex parte Jackson.400
Like a telephone call, when an individual deposits a letter in the mail, the
Postal Service has full control over the communication. Although postal
agents could easily open up letters and read their contents, as was in fact
widely done during the colonial period,40 1 the Postal Service is not
expected to do so, and the contents of letters are strongly protected by the
Fourth Amendment. 40 2 The Postal Service is, however, expected to deliver
letters and, in doing so, is expected to read the address and other
information written on the exterior. 40 3 Similar to a phone number, because
the address is directly communicated to the Postal Service for use in
delivering the letters, it is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 404
However, the content of the letter, like the content of the phone call, is not
similarly directed and is strongly protected by the Fourth Amendment. 40 5
This distinction is equally applicable to e-mail and other electronic
communications. Some information, namely the recipient's address, is
conveyed to the ISP for its use in routing the message.406 The ISP is privy
to this information and, for Fourth Amendment purposes, is analogous to
Hoffa's associate-free to disseminate the information as it wishes. 407
396. See supra Part I.A.1.
397. Providers and customers are, of course, free to contract for greater protections and
require that the phone company not freely disclose this information. Additionally, although
not protected under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the analogous provision
in the New Jersey State Constitution has been interpreted to cover this information. See
supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
400. See supra Part I.B.2.
401. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 129-32, 147-49 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
406. See supra note 31.
407. Additional restrictions on disclosure can be enforced contractually.
[Vol. 78
2009] PROTECTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 395
However, like the substance of a telephone conversation or the text of a
letter, the contents of e-mail messages are not directed to, nor expected to
be read, by ISPs.40 8 The ISP in this case is not truly a party to the
communication, and the third-party doctrine does not apply as the Sixth
Circuit panel concluded in Warshak and the Ninth Circuit suggested in
Quon. 409
Additionally, by analogy to postal mail and telephone conversations, the
contents of e-mail messages should also be strongly protected by the Fourth
Amendment.4 10 As the Court recognized early on in Ex parte Jackson,
"The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their
papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers,
thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be."'4 11  Electronic
communications are similarly "closed" and not expected to be reviewed by
the intermediaries merely charged with delivering the messages.
This analysis does not change merely because an ISP may retain backup
or archival copies of messages in its database. This storage is
fundamentally different from the storage of bank records in Miller because,
in that instance, the information had been communicated to the bank for its
use. 4 12 In this situation, the ISP merely has access to the information, but
was never an intended recipient of the message. In Miller, the documents
were shared with the bank on the assumption that it would not turn the
information over to anyone else, and certainly not law enforcement. 4 13
However, like Jimmy Hoffa, that "misplaced reliance" eliminated the
depositor's expectation of privacy in the documents. 41 4  There is no
misplaced reliance in the case of the electronic communications at issue
because, unlike the financial instruments in Miller, they are never directed
to the provider. As such, users still maintain reasonable expectations of
privacy in their communications even if archival copies are created and
stored in the third party's electronic database.
Further bolstering the conclusion that the nature of the third-party service
provider's use of, and interaction with, the communications does not work
to bring it within the purview of the third-party doctrine is the immense
importance of privacy in electronic communications. 4 15  In Katz, the
Supreme Court recognized the tremendous importance of the telephone and
corrected its earlier error in Olmstead by giving strong protection to
408. See supra notes 31-33, 81 and accompanying text.
409. Supra notes 315-22, 350-56 and accompanying text.
410. See supra Part I.B.l.b, I.B.2. Similarly, while considering the level of protection
that should be afforded to telegrams, Judge Thomas M. Cooley remarked on the analogy
between telegrams and postal mail, noting that the two types of communication should be
similarly protected by the Fourth Amendment. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying
text.
411. Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
412. Cf supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 35-38, 70-75 and accompanying text.
415. See, e.g., supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
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telephone calls. 416 Similarly, in Ex parte Jackson the Court acknowledged
the central role of the mail system and, in the face of widespread snooping,
gave strong protection to the mails.417 Although never discussed in a
reported judicial opinion, the public even expected privacy in telegraph
messages, where the technology required operators to actually read the
contents of transmissions. 418  And, in attempting to enact protective
legislation, congressional representatives noted the tremendous importance
of the telegraph system and the problems that would flow if individuals
could not be guaranteed some privacy in using it. 419
Congress recognized that many of these same problems would exist if
electronic communications were not adequately protected and attempted to
enact strong protective legislation. 420 However, in the short period since
the SCA was enacted, computer use has significantly changed. 421 The
Ninth Circuit's decision in Quon and the Sixth Circuit panel's decision in
Warshak recognize that electronic communications are protected by the
Fourth Amendment and that the provision in § 2703 of the SCA that
permits the government to access messages greater than 180 days old
without first securing a warrant supported by probable cause is
unconstitutional. 422 An individual's reasonable expectation of privacy and
Fourth Amendment protections do not evaporate over time. Congress
recognized that messages less than 180 days old would likely be protected
under the Fourth Amendment, 423 and, now that individuals frequently store
messages on servers for longer periods of time, the statute should be
modified to recognize this.
Furthermore, this provision is also problematic because it allows
government actors broad access to all of an individual's electronic
communications without any meaningful restriction. 424 This unbridled
access would in some cases permit law enforcement to engage in "fishing
expeditions," one of the chief evils against which the framers of the Fourth
Amendment sought to guard. 425
At the same time, consistent with Smith and Miller, users do not have
legitimate expectations of privacy in information turned over to third
parties.426 Therefore, the provision in § 2703(c)(2) of the SCA that allows
government access to subscriber information is consistent with the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because this information is
416. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 160-62, 191-93 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
420. See supra Part I.C. 1.
421. See supra Part I.C.3.
422. See supra Part II.B. 1-2.
423. See supra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
424. See generally supra Part I.C.2.
425. Cf supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
426. See supra Part .A; supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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voluntarily turned over to the provider in order to establish an account. 427
However, particularly where the provider expressly states that it will not
review a user's messages, 428 and where Congress itself recognized that mail
less than 180 days old is likely protected under the Fourth Amendment, 429
subscriber information is significantly different from communications the
provider stored in a database but was never a party to.
As the panel decision in Warshak concluded, because § 2703 of the SCA
allows the government to access material protected by the Fourth
Amendment without a warrant supported by probable cause, it is
unconstitutional.4 30  Although this Note argues that, irrespective of
legislative action, electronic messages are protected by the Fourth
Amendment, until the Supreme Court considers this issue the level of
protection remains largely unknown, and lower courts could potentially
reach divergent results. In the face of this uncertainty, Congress should
revise the SCA to eliminate the distinction between mail greater and less
than 180 days old and extend the same, high level of protection to all
electronic communications, regardless of how long they have been in
storage.
CONCLUSION
Information gleaned from e-mail messages will likely become an
increasingly important tool for law enforcement agencies to use in
combating crime, and they should be encouraged to rely on it going
forward. However, law enforcement may not take advantage of the
anomaly that has resulted where, although Congress attempted to legislate
to protect electronic communications, evolving uses actually resulted in
communications having less protection than is provided by the Constitution.
Electronic communications do frequently pass through third parties, but the
third parties are not parties to the transmissions. Their minimal interaction
does not eliminate the sender or receiver's expectation of privacy in, or
Fourth Amendment protections for, the messages. The same requirement
that law enforcement obtain a warrant before searching e-mail messages
less than 180 days old should also apply to mail greater than 180 days old.
Users' expectations of privacy do not disappear over time, and the same
rationale that led Congress to conclude that messages less than 180 days old
are protected by the Fourth Amendment should be adopted to keep pace
with technology and the current practice of storing messages for more than
180 days. Because all electronic messages, regardless of age, are protected
by the Fourth Amendment, § 2703(b) of the SCA, which allows law
enforcement to access communications greater than 180 days old without a
warrant, is unconstitutional.
427. See supra Part I.A.2; but cf supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
428. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 322-24 and accompanying text.
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